Niels Bohr cytaty
Niels Bohr
Data urodzenia: 7. Październik 1885
Data zgonu: 18. Listopad 1962
Natępne imiona: Нильс Бор
Niels Henrik David Bohr – duński fizyk, laureat Nagrody Nobla w dziedzinie fizyki w 1922 za opracowanie badania struktury atomu.
Jego prace naukowe przyczyniły się do zrozumienia budowy atomu oraz rozwoju mechaniki kwantowej.
Cytaty Niels Bohr
„(…) twoja teoria jest szalona, jednak za mało szalona, aby być prawdziwą.“
Inna wersja: (…) twoja teoria jest szalona. Nie możemy się jednak zgodzić co do tego, czy jest ona wystarczająco szalona.
do Wolfganga Pauliego; cytat przypisywany.
„Nie wierzę, ale słyszałem, że to działa, nawet jeśli się nie wierzy.“
cytat przypisywany Bohrowi przez Heisenberga, odpowiedź fizyka na pytanie, czy wierzy w działanie zawieszonej na ścianie w jego domu podkowy.
Źródło: Jostein Gaarder, Świat Zofii. Cudowna podróż w głąb historii filozofii, Warszawa 1995, tłum. Iwona Zimnicka, s. 396.
„Istnieją dwa rodzaje prawd. Są prawdy powierzchowne, których przeciwieństwo jest wyraźnie nieprawdziwe. Ale istnieją także prawdy głębokie, których przeciwieństwo jest równie prawdziwe jak one same.“
Źródło: Jostein Gaarder, Świat Zofii. Cudowna podróż w głąb historii filozofii, Warszawa 1995, tłum. Iwona Zimnicka, s. 396.
„Albert Einstein: Bóg nie gra w kości.
Niels Bohr: Albercie, przestań wreszcie mówić Bogu, co ma robić.“
reakcja Bohra, gdy Einstein po raz kolejny powtórzył swój słynny aforyzm.
Źródło: Olga Andriejewa, W głowach uczonych, „Russkij Rieportior”, tłum. „Forum”, 27 września 2010.
„Równolegle do lekcji z teorii atomu musimy zwrócić się ku problemom epistemologicznym, z którymi zetknęli się już tacy myśliciele jak Budda i Laozi, próbujących zharmonizować naszą sytuację widzów i aktorów w wielkim dramacie egzystencji.“
Źródło: Forma i Pustka. Od buddyzmu do nauki i z powrotem, Hung, Opole 2005.
„Do podstawowych założeń naszej nauki należy to, że o pomiarach mówimy językiem mającym zasadniczo taką samą strukturę jak ten, którym mówimy o doświadczeniach życia powszedniego. Nauczyliśmy się, że język ten jest bardzo niedoskonałym instrumentem orientacji i porozumienia. Instrument ten jest jednak jednocześnie założeniem naszej nauki.“
Źródło: Werner Heisenberg, Część i całość
„Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something a priori given, but rather as the development of methods of ordering and surveying human experience.“
"The Unity of Human Knowledge" (October 1960)
Kontekst: Physics is to be regarded not so much as the study of something a priori given, but rather as the development of methods of ordering and surveying human experience. In this respect our task must be to account for such experience in a manner independent of individual subjective judgement and therefore objective in the sense that it can be unambiguously communicated in ordinary human language.
„I consider those developments in physics during the last decades which have shown how problematical such concepts as "objective" and "subjective" are, a great liberation of thought.“
Remarks after the Solvay Conference (1927)
Kontekst: I consider those developments in physics during the last decades which have shown how problematical such concepts as "objective" and "subjective" are, a great liberation of thought. The whole thing started with the theory of relativity. In the past, the statement that two events are simultaneous was considered an objective assertion, one that could be communicated quite simply and that was open to verification by any observer. Today we know that 'simultaneity' contains a subjective element, inasmuch as two events that appear simultaneous to an observer at rest are not necessarily simultaneous to an observer in motion. However, the relativistic description is also objective inasmuch as every observer can deduce by calculation what the other observer will perceive or has perceived. For all that, we have come a long way from the classical ideal of objective descriptions.
In quantum mechanics the departure from this ideal has been even more radical. We can still use the objectifying language of classical physics to make statements about observable facts. For instance, we can say that a photographic plate has been blackened, or that cloud droplets have formed. But we can say nothing about the atoms themselves. And what predictions we base on such findings depend on the way we pose our experimental question, and here the observer has freedom of choice. Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation. To that extent, every physical process may be said to have objective and subjective features. The objective world of nineteenth-century science was, as we know today, an ideal, limiting case, but not the whole reality. Admittedly, even in our future encounters with reality we shall have to distinguish between the objective and the subjective side, to make a division between the two. But the location of the separation may depend on the way things are looked at; to a certain extent it can be chosen at will. Hence I can quite understand why we cannot speak about the content of religion in an objectifying language. The fact that different religions try to express this content in quite distinct spiritual forms is no real objection. Perhaps we ought to look upon these different forms as complementary descriptions which, though they exclude one another, are needed to convey the rich possibilities flowing from man's relationship with the central order.
„Stop telling God what to do with his dice.“
A response to Einstein's assertion that "God doesn't play dice"; a similar statement is attributed to Enrico Fermi
Disputed
Wariant: Einstein, don't tell God what to do.
Wariant: Don't tell God what to do with his dice.
Wariant: You ought not to speak for what Providence can or can not do. – As described in The Physicists: A generation that changed the world (1981) by C. P. Snow, p. 84
„Two sorts of truth: profound truths recognized by the fact that the opposite is also a profound truth, in contrast to trivialities where opposites are obviously absurd.“
As quoted by his son Hans Bohr in "My Father", published in Niels Bohr: His Life and Work (1967), p. 328
Unsourced variant: The opposite of a correct statement is a false statement. But the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth.
As quoted in Max Delbrück, Mind from Matter: An Essay on Evolutionary Epistemology, (1986) p. 167. It is the hallmark of any deep truth that its negation is also a deep truth
„Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation.“
Remarks after the Solvay Conference (1927)
Kontekst: I consider those developments in physics during the last decades which have shown how problematical such concepts as "objective" and "subjective" are, a great liberation of thought. The whole thing started with the theory of relativity. In the past, the statement that two events are simultaneous was considered an objective assertion, one that could be communicated quite simply and that was open to verification by any observer. Today we know that 'simultaneity' contains a subjective element, inasmuch as two events that appear simultaneous to an observer at rest are not necessarily simultaneous to an observer in motion. However, the relativistic description is also objective inasmuch as every observer can deduce by calculation what the other observer will perceive or has perceived. For all that, we have come a long way from the classical ideal of objective descriptions.
In quantum mechanics the departure from this ideal has been even more radical. We can still use the objectifying language of classical physics to make statements about observable facts. For instance, we can say that a photographic plate has been blackened, or that cloud droplets have formed. But we can say nothing about the atoms themselves. And what predictions we base on such findings depend on the way we pose our experimental question, and here the observer has freedom of choice. Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation. To that extent, every physical process may be said to have objective and subjective features. The objective world of nineteenth-century science was, as we know today, an ideal, limiting case, but not the whole reality. Admittedly, even in our future encounters with reality we shall have to distinguish between the objective and the subjective side, to make a division between the two. But the location of the separation may depend on the way things are looked at; to a certain extent it can be chosen at will. Hence I can quite understand why we cannot speak about the content of religion in an objectifying language. The fact that different religions try to express this content in quite distinct spiritual forms is no real objection. Perhaps we ought to look upon these different forms as complementary descriptions which, though they exclude one another, are needed to convey the rich possibilities flowing from man's relationship with the central order.
„We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry.“
In his first meeting with Werner Heisenberg in early summer 1920, in response to questions on the nature of language, as reported in Discussions about Language (1933); quoted in Defense Implications of International Indeterminacy (1972) by Robert J. Pranger, p. 11, and Theorizing Modernism : Essays in Critical Theory (1993) by Steve Giles, p. 28
Kontekst: We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creating images and establishing mental connections.
„The objective world of nineteenth-century science was, as we know today, an ideal, limiting case, but not the whole reality.“
Remarks after the Solvay Conference (1927)
Kontekst: I consider those developments in physics during the last decades which have shown how problematical such concepts as "objective" and "subjective" are, a great liberation of thought. The whole thing started with the theory of relativity. In the past, the statement that two events are simultaneous was considered an objective assertion, one that could be communicated quite simply and that was open to verification by any observer. Today we know that 'simultaneity' contains a subjective element, inasmuch as two events that appear simultaneous to an observer at rest are not necessarily simultaneous to an observer in motion. However, the relativistic description is also objective inasmuch as every observer can deduce by calculation what the other observer will perceive or has perceived. For all that, we have come a long way from the classical ideal of objective descriptions.
In quantum mechanics the departure from this ideal has been even more radical. We can still use the objectifying language of classical physics to make statements about observable facts. For instance, we can say that a photographic plate has been blackened, or that cloud droplets have formed. But we can say nothing about the atoms themselves. And what predictions we base on such findings depend on the way we pose our experimental question, and here the observer has freedom of choice. Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation. To that extent, every physical process may be said to have objective and subjective features. The objective world of nineteenth-century science was, as we know today, an ideal, limiting case, but not the whole reality. Admittedly, even in our future encounters with reality we shall have to distinguish between the objective and the subjective side, to make a division between the two. But the location of the separation may depend on the way things are looked at; to a certain extent it can be chosen at will. Hence I can quite understand why we cannot speak about the content of religion in an objectifying language. The fact that different religions try to express this content in quite distinct spiritual forms is no real objection. Perhaps we ought to look upon these different forms as complementary descriptions which, though they exclude one another, are needed to convey the rich possibilities flowing from man's relationship with the central order.
