Ludwig Wittgenstein citations

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein est un philosophe et mathématicien autrichien, puis britannique, qui apporta des contributions décisives en logique, dans la théorie des fondements des mathématiques et en philosophie du langage.

Ludwig Wittgenstein ne publia de son vivant qu’une œuvre majeure : le Tractatus logico-philosophicus, dont une première version parut en 1921 à Vienne. Dans cette œuvre influencée à la fois par la lecture de Schopenhauer et de Kierkegaard, et par Frege, Moore et Russell, Wittgenstein montre les limites du langage et de la faculté de connaître de l’homme. Le Tractatus a donné lieu à de nombreuses interprétations, parfois difficilement conciliables. Alors que la signification mystique de ce texte est pour Wittgenstein éthique et esthétique, la plupart des lectures ont mis en avant son intérêt en logique et en philosophie du langage. C’est l’une des pièces majeures de la philosophie de Wittgenstein, il est inspiré par un logicisme anti-psychologiste, une position qu’il abandonna par la suite. Récemment, des études qui lui sont consacrées ont commencé à considérer l’aspect mystique de l’œuvre comme central. Wittgenstein pensa alors avoir apporté une solution à tous les problèmes philosophiques auxquels il était envisageable de répondre ; il quitta l'Angleterre et se détourna de la philosophie jusqu'en 1929. À cette date, il revint à Cambridge sous l’insistance de Bertrand Russell et George Moore, et critiqua les principes de son premier traité. Il développa alors une nouvelle méthode philosophique et proposa une nouvelle manière d’appréhender le langage, développée dans sa seconde grande œuvre, Investigations philosophiques, publiée, comme nombre de ses travaux, après sa mort. Cette autocritique sévère est rare dans l’histoire de la philosophie, voire quasi inexistante, faisant de Wittgenstein, au même titre que Platon, un exemple de remise en question de sa propre pensée.

Son œuvre a eu – et conserve – une influence majeure sur le courant de la philosophie analytique et plus récemment en anthropologie et ethnométhodologie. Dans un premier temps, le Tractatus a influencé son ancien professeur Bertrand Russell, mais surtout les néopositivistes du Cercle de Vienne, même si Wittgenstein considérait que ceux-ci commettaient de graves contresens sur la signification de sa pensée. Les deux « époques » de sa pensée ont profondément marqué nombre de ses élèves et d'autres philosophes. Parmi les « wittgensteiniens », on compte Friedrich Waismann, Gilbert Ryle, Rush Rhees, Norman Malcolm, Peter Geach et Elizabeth Anscombe. Plus récemment, son influence est sensible chez Stanley Cavell, Jürgen Habermas, D.Z. Phillips, Ian Hacking, Saul Kripke, Alasdair MacIntyre, Hilary Putnam, ou encore James Conant, ainsi qu’en France chez Gilles Gaston Granger, Jacques Bouveresse, Vincent Descombes, Jean-Pierre Cometti, Christiane Chauviré, Sandra Laugier, Jocelyn Benoist, Jean-Claude Passeron ou Bernard Aspe. Wikipedia  

✵ 26. avril 1889 – 29. avril 1951   •   Autres noms Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein photo

Œuvres

De la certitude
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein: 256   citations 1   J'aime

Ludwig Wittgenstein citations célèbres

“[…] il importe peu que les questions restent sans réponse.”

Lettres, rencontres, souvenirs

Ludwig Wittgenstein Citations

“L’image peut remplacer une description.”

Carnets 1914-1916

“Le langage n'est pas issu d'un raisonnement.”

De la certitude

“et lui substituer la vérité.”

Remarques sur

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Citations en anglais

“I don't know why we are here, but I'm pretty sure that it is not in order to enjoy ourselves.”

As quoted in The Beginning of the End (2004) by Peter Hershey, p. 109
Also, as quoted in "The Relentless Rise of Science as Fun", by Jeremy Burgess, in New Scientist, Volume 143, Issues 1932-1945, originally published 1994.
Attributed from posthumous publications

“Death is not an event in life: we do not live to experience death. If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.”

6.4311
Der Tod ist kein Ereignis des Lebens. Den Tod erlebt man nicht. Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt. Unser Leben ist ebenso endlos, wie unser Gesichtsfeld grenzenlos ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Variante: Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.
If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.

“There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”

6.522
Original German: Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

“The subject does not belong to the world, but it is a limit of the world.”

5.632
Original German: Das Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

“Not how the world is, but that it is, is the mystery.”

Variant translation: The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is.
Original German: Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern dass sie ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Variante: The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is.
Contexte: It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (6.44)

“A serious and good philosophical work could be written consisting entirely of jokes.”

As quoted in "A View from the Asylum" in Philosophical Investigations from the Sanctity of the Press (2004), by Henry Dribble, p. 87
Attributed from posthumous publications

“Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.”

Journal entry (8 July 1916), p. 74e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexte: There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.
I am either happy or unhappy, that is all. It can be said: good or evil do not exist.
A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death.
Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.

“It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true.”

4.442
Original German: Ein Satz kann unmöglich von sich selbst aussagen, dass er wahr ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

“I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!!”

Journal entries (12 March 1915 and 15 March 1915) p. 41e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexte: I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!!
That is, I cannot bring out how far the proposition is the picture of the situation. I am almost inclined to give up all my efforts.

“Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.”

Original German:Die Logik erfüllt die Welt; die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen. Wir können also in der Logik nicht sagen: Das und das gibt es in der Welt, jenes nicht.Das würde nämlich scheinbar voraussetzen, dass wir gewisse Möglichkeiten ausschließen, und dies kann nicht der Fall sein, da sonst die Logik über die Grenzen der Welt hinaus müsste; wenn sie nämlich diese Grenzen auch von der anderen Seite betrachten könnte. Was wir nicht denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können also auch nicht sagen, was wir nicht denken können.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Contexte: Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, "The world has this in it, and this, but not that." For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)

“What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.”

Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexte: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

“The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.”

Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexte: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them.”

He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.
6.54
Original German: Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie—auf ihnen—über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.)
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

“Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.”

Variant translation: Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions." but to make propositions clear.
Original German: Der Zweck der Philosophie ist die logische Klärung der Gedanken. Die Philosophie ist keine Lehre, sondern eine Tätigkeit. Ein philosophisches Werk besteht wesentlich aus Erläuterungen. Das Resultat der Philosophie sind nicht „philosophische Sätze“, sondern das Klarwerden von Sätzen. Die Philosophie soll die Gedanken, die sonst, gleichsam, trübe und verschwommen sind, klar machen und scharf abgrenzen.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Contexte: Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (4.112)

“What is troubling us is the tendency to believe that the mind is like a little man within.”

Remarks to John Wisdom, quoted in Zen and the Work of WIttgenstein by Paul Weinpaul in The Chicago Review Vol. 12, (1958), p. 70
Attributed from posthumous publications

“A tautology's truth is certain, a proposition's possible, a contradiction's impossible.”

Ludwig Wittgenstein livre Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Certain, possible, impossible: here we have the first indication of the scale that we need in the theory of probability.
4.464
Original German: Die Wahrheit der Tautologie ist gewiss, des Satzes möglich, der Kontradiktion unmöglich
Source: 1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

“The problems are dissolved in the actual sense of the word — like a lump of sugar in water.”

Source: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 183

“The difficulty in philosophy is to say no more than we know.”

Source: 1930s-1951, The Blue Book (c. 1931–1935; published 1965), p. 45

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