Baruch Spinoza cytaty

strona 4

„(…) wyrazy „dobro” i „zło” mają znaczenie tylko względne, a więc jedną i tę samą rzecz można nazwać dobrą lub złą zależnie od tego, pod jakim względem jest wzięta.”

„Jestestwo wieczne i nieskończone, które nazywamy Bogiem, czyli Naturą, działa z tą samą koniecznością, z jaką istnieje.”

„To wszystko, co życie zazwyczaj nastręcza, a co ludzie, jak można sądzić z ich czynów, poczytują za dobro najwyższe, daje się sprowadzić do trzech rzeczy, a mianowicie: bogactwa, zaszczytów i rozkoszy zmysłowej.”

„Miłość nie jest czym innym, jak radowaniem się.”

„Lęk nie może istnieć bez nadziei, ani nadzieja bez lęku.”

„Oto jest cel, do którego zmierzam: pozyskanie takiej właśnie natury oraz staranie się o to, aby wielu ludzi razem ze mną ją posiadło. To znaczy, że do mego własnego szczęścia należy też dbanie o to, aby wielu innych ludzi zrozumiało to, co ja, i aby ich rozumienie i pożądanie pozostawały w zupełnej zgodności z moim rozumieniem i pożądaniem.”

„(…) wiedza o jedności łącząca umysł z całą Naturą.”

„(…) wszystko, co zachodzi, dzieje się według wiecznego porządku i stałych praw Natury.”

„Im lepiej rozumiesz siebie i swoje emocje, tym bardziej zaczynasz kochać to, co jest.”

„Przyjemność może być nadmierna i zła, przykrość zaś o tyle może być dobra, o ile przyjemność, czyli radość, jest zła.”

„Starałem się jedynie, aby ludzkich postępków nie wyśmiewać, nie opłakiwać i nie potępiać, lecz je zrozumieć.”

„(…) dobrze było mi wiadomo, jakie korzyści zdobywa się przez zaszczyty i bogactwo, ale również i to, że musiałbym wstrzymać się od pożądania ich, gdybym miał ubiegać się poważnie o rzecz nową, a zupełnie inną. Jasne było dla mnie, że gdyby szczęście najwyższe miało na tych właśnie rzeczach polegać, to musiałbym go być pozbawiony, gdyby zaś nie miało na nich polegać, a jednak za niemi tylko bym się ubiegał, to tak samo nie dostąpiłbym szczęścia najwyższego.”

„Zadowolenie z samego siebie jest prawdopodobnie najtrudniej osiągalne.”

„Każde określenie jest negacją.”

„Kto prawdziwie Kocha Boga, nie pragnie Jego Miłości wzajem.”

„Cokolwiek jest, jest w Bogu i nic bez Boga nie może być, ani dać się pojąć.”

„(…) liczne są przykłady ludzi, którzy dla swych bogactw ponosili prześladowania, dochodzące aż do śmierci, tudzież takich, którzy dla zdobycia skarbów narażali się na niebezpieczeństwa, aż w końcu życiem przypłacili swą głupotę.”

„Ludzka wolność ludzi polega zaledwie na tym, że człowiek zna swoje pragnienia, nie zna natomiast przyczyn, które je wywołują.”

„Im więcej posiadamy radości, tym doskonalsi jesteśmy.”

„(…) nic nie jest dobre lub złe samo w sobie.”

„Nie istnieją kłamstwa, a jedynie kalekie prawdy.”

„Szlachetne dusze nie smucą się z uczynionego dobra.”

„Ten, kto się śmieje ostatni, przeważnie nie ma jednego zęba na przedzie.”

„Nienawiść, którą całkowicie pokonała miłość, zamienia się w miłość, a jest ona tym większa, niż gdyby nie poprzedzała jej nienawiść.”

„Gdy chodzi o sprawy ludzkie, nie śmiać się, nie płakać, nie oburzać się, lecz rozumieć.”

“I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the lawful harmony of the world, not in a God who concerns himself with the fate and the doings of mankind.”

“For many years he had suffered from consumption, aggravated perhaps by his work of glass polishing. On Sunday, February 21, 1677, the end came unexpectedly, and almost suddenly. …
Credit must be given to Colerus [John Kohler]… for his downright contradiction of the tales concerning Spinoza's death-bed which were circulated, it would seem, by persons who thought it would tend to edification to represent Spinoza as the blustering infidel of popular orthodox polemics, who is invariably assailed by doubt and disquietude in his last moments, and as invariably strives to disguise them with feeble bravado. Colerus very honestly says that the people of the house… knew nothing of any such matters, and did not believe a word of them.”

“Spinoza is the Christ of philosophers, and the greatest philosophers are hardly more than apostles who distance themselves from or draw near to this mystery.”

“These distinctions make sense only when AR [absolute perfection in some respects, relative perfection in all others] is assumed (hence Spinoza's failure, who assumed mere A). Just as AR is the whole positive content of perfection, so CW, or the conception of the Creator-and-the-Whole-of-what-he-has-created as constituting one life, the super-whole which in its everlasting essence is uncreated (and does not necessitate just the parts which the whole has) but in its de facto concreteness is created — this panentheistic doctrine contains all of deism and pandeism except their arbitrary negations. Thus ARCW, or absolute-relative panentheism, is the one doctrine that really states the whole of what all theists, if not all atheists as/well, are implicitly talking about.”

“I assert, that the doctrine of the immateriality, simplicity, and indivisibility of a thinking substance is a true atheism, and will serve to justify all those sentiments, for which Spinoza is so universally infamous. From this topic, I hope at least to reap one advantage, that my adversaries will not have any pretext to render the present doctrine odious by their declamations, when they see that they can be so easily retorted on them.”

“All the better; they do not force me to do anything that I would not have done of my own accord if I did not dread scandal. But since they want it that way, I enter gladly on the path that is opened to me, with the consolation that my departure will be more innocent than was the exodus of the early Hebrews from Egypt.”

“This endeavour to do a thing or leave it undone, solely in order to please men, we call ambition, especially when we so eagerly endeavour to please the vulgar, that we do or omit certain things to our own or another's hurt : in other cases it is generally called kindliness.”
Hic conatus aliquid agendi et etiam omittendi ea sola de causa ut hominibus placeamus, vocatur ambitio præsertim quando adeo impense vulgo placere conamur ut cum nostro aut alterius damno quædam agamus vel omittamus; alias humanitas appellari solet.

“We can conceive of various kinds of democracy. But my intention is not to treat of every kind, but of that only, "wherein all, without exception, who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only, and are further independent and of respectable life, have the right of voting in the supreme council and of filling the offices of the dominion."”

“After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness.”

“Of all the things that are beyond my power, I value nothing more highly than to be allowed the honor of entering into bonds of friendship with people who sincerely love truth. For, of things beyond our power, I believe there is nothing in the world which we can love with tranquility except such men.”

“All happiness or unhappiness solely depends upon the quality of the object to which we are attached by love.”
Tota felicitas aut infelicitas in hoc solo sita est; videlicet in qualitate obiecti, cui adhaeremus amore.

“Human infirmity in moderating and checking the emotions I name bondage: for, when a man is a prey to his emotions, he is not his own master, but lies at the mercy of fortune: so much so, that he is often compelled, while seeing that which is better for him, to follow that which is worse.”
Humanam impotentiam in moderandis et coercendis affectibus servitutem voco; homo enim affectibus obnoxius sui juris non est sed fortunæ in cujus potestate ita est ut sæpe coactus sit quanquam meliora sibi videat, deteriora tamen sequi.

“The dominant feature in his character was his devotion to the pursuit of truth”

“The fundamental principle of the atheism of Spinoza is the doctrine of the simplicity of the universe, and the unity of that substance, in which he supposes both thought and matter to inhere. There is only one substance, says he, in the world; and that substance is perfectly simple and indivisible, and exists every where, without any local presence. Whatever we discover externally by sensation; whatever we feel internally by reflection; all these are nothing but modifications of that one, simple, and necessarily existent being, and are not possest of any separate or distinct existence. Every passion of the soul; every configuration of matter, however different and various, inhere in the same substance, and preserve in themselves their characters of distinction, without communicating them to that subject, in which they inhere.”

“My atheism, like that of Spinoza, is true piety toward the universe and denies only gods fashioned by men in their own image, to be servants of their human interests.”

“My purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things.”
Meum institutum non est verborum significationem sed rerum naturam explicare

“[We] will discuss Soul and Body, the doctrine of God, and Ethics. …We shall find that Leibniz no longer shows great originality, but tends, with slight alterations of phraseology, to adopt (without acknowledgment) the views of the decried Spinoza. We shall find also many more minor inconsistencies than in the earlier part of [Leibniz's] system, these being due chiefly to the desire to avoid the impieties of the Jewish Atheist, and the still greater impieties to which Leibniz's own logic should have led him.”

“Nature is satisfied with little; and if she is, I am also.”

“…from the perspective of the eternal.”
sub specie aeternitatis

“How much do I love that noble man
More than I could tell with words
I fear though he'll remain alone
With a holy halo of his own.”

“Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from taking arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than that it has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue that springs from force of character : for obedience is the constant will to execute what, by the general decree of the commonwealth, ought to be done. Besides, that commonwealth, whose peace depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth.”
Civitas, cuius subditi metu territi arma non capiunt, potius dicenda est, quod sine bello sit, quam quod pacem habeat. Pax enim non belli privatio, sed virtus est, quae ex animi fortitudine oritur; est namque obsequium constans voluntas id exsequendi, quod ex communi civitatis decreto fieri debet. Illa praeterea civitas, cuius pax a subditorum inertia pendet, qui scilicet veluti pecora ducuntur, ut tantum servire discant, rectius solitudo, quam civitas dici potest.

“Spinoza is, for me, the prince of philosophers.”

“I pass, at length, to the third and perfectly absolute dominion, which we call democracy.”

“All laws which can be broken without any injury to another, are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from bridling the desires and lusts of men, that on the contrary they stimulate them.”

“Ultimately there are but three systems of ethics, three conceptions of the ideal character and the moral life. One is that of Buddha and Jesus, which stresses the feminine virtues, considers all men to be equally precious, resists evil only by returning good, identifies virtue with love, and inclines in politics to unlimited democracy. Another is the ethic of Machiavelli and Nietzsche, which stresses the masculine virtues, accepts the inequality of men, relishes the risks of combat and conquest and rule, identifies virtue with power, and exalts an hereditary aristocracy. A third, the ethic of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, denies the universal applicability of either the feminine or the masculine virtues; considers that only the informed and mature mind can judge, according to diverse circumstance, when love should rule, and when power; identifies virtue, therefore, with intelligence; and advocates a varying mixture of aristocracy and democracy in government. It is the distinction of Spinoza that his ethic unconsciously reconciles these apparently hostile philosophies, weaves them into a harmonious unity, and gives us in consequence a system of morals which is the supreme achievement of modern thought.”

“"Spinoza did not seek to found a sect, and he founded none"; yet all philosophy after him is permeated with his thought.”

“A free man thinks of death least of all things; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death but of life.”
Homo liber de nulla re minus, quam de morte cogitat, et ejus sapientia non mortis, sed vitae meditatio est.

“Truth is a standard both of itself and of falsity”
veritas norma sui et falsi est

“Spinoza, then, emerged as the supreme philosophical bogeyman of Early Enlightenment Europe. Admittedly, historians have rarely emphasized this. It has been much more common, and still is, to claim that Spinoza was rarely understood and had very little influence, a typical example of an abiding historiographical refrain which appears to be totally untrue but nevertheless, since the nineteenth century, has exerted an enduring appeal for all manner of scholars. In fact, no one else during the century 1650–1750 remotely rivalled Spinoza's notoriety as the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion, received ideas, tradition, morality, and what was everywhere regarded, in absolutist and non-absolutist states alike, as divinely constituted political authority.”