Ludwig Wittgenstein idézet
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Születési dátum: 26. április 1889
Halál dátuma: 29. április 1951
Más nevek: Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein osztrák filozófus, a huszadik század egyik legnagyobb hatású gondolkodója, jelentősen hozzájárult a logika, a matematikafilozófia és a nyelvfilozófia fejlődéséhez. Wikipedia
Idézetek Ludwig Wittgenstein
„Ha egy oroszlán beszélni tudna, mi nem lennénk képesek őt megérteni.“
Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások
„Amiről nem lehet beszélni, arról hallgatni kell.“
Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások
Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 53e
„You can’t be reluctant to give up your lie and still tell the truth.“
Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 44e
„What is troubling us is the tendency to believe that the mind is like a little man within.“
Remarks to John Wisdom, quoted in Zen and the Work of WIttgenstein by Paul Weinpaul in The Chicago Review Vol. 12, (1958), p. 70
Attributed from posthumous publications
6.522
Original German: Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
„The subject does not belong to the world, but it is a limit of the world.“
5.632
Original German: Das Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
„It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true.“
4.442
Original German: Ein Satz kann unmöglich von sich selbst aussagen, dass er wahr ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Forrás: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 165
Corresponding to TS 213, Kapitel 87, 409
„What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.“
Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Kontextus: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.
He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.
6.54
Original German: Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie—auf ihnen—über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.)
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
— Ludwig Wittgenstein, könyv On Certainty
On Certainty (1969)
„The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.“
Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Kontextus: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.
„Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits.“
Original German:Die Logik erfüllt die Welt; die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen. Wir können also in der Logik nicht sagen: Das und das gibt es in der Welt, jenes nicht.Das würde nämlich scheinbar voraussetzen, dass wir gewisse Möglichkeiten ausschließen, und dies kann nicht der Fall sein, da sonst die Logik über die Grenzen der Welt hinaus müsste; wenn sie nämlich diese Grenzen auch von der anderen Seite betrachten könnte. Was wir nicht denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können also auch nicht sagen, was wir nicht denken können.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Kontextus: Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, "The world has this in it, and this, but not that." For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)