Simone de Beauvoir idézet
Simone de Beauvoir
Születési dátum: 9. január 1908
Halál dátuma: 14. április 1986
Más nevek: Simone De Beauvoirová
Simone de Beauvoir francia írónő, filozófus. A 20. század második felének egyik népszerű, meghatározó feminista, egzisztencialista gondolkodója. Nagy hatással volt a második világháború után megerősödött fogyasztói, jóléti társadalomban felnövő ifjúságára. Legismertebb könyve, A második nem részletes elemzése a nők elnyomásának, a feminizmus egyik alapműve, és a feminizmus második hullámának elindítója. Irodalmi tevékenysége is említésre méltó, több regény és esszé szerzője. Wikipedia
Művek
Idézetek Simone de Beauvoir
„Kevés emberi élmény tárja fel megragadóbban az emberi sors kétértelműségét, mint a szexuális tapasztalat, melynek során egyszerre s együtt érzi magát testnek és léleknek, szubjektumnak és Másiknak. Az ebből fakadó konfliktus a nő esetében szükségszerűen élesebb, mint a férfinál, mert kezdetben kénytelen tárgyként megragadni önmagát, s nehezen leli fel szilárd autonómiáját a gyönyörben: ehhez előbb vissza kell hódítania szabad és transzcendens szubjektuma elvesztett méltóságát, de úgy, hogy egyidejűleg vállalja és betöltse a sorsot, melyre teste rendeli. Ez nehéz és kockázatos vállalkozás, sokszor kudarcba is fullad. De a nőt éppen helyzetének ellentmondásossága óvja meg az önáltatás csapdáitól, melyekbe a férfi oly gyakran beleesik, mert tévútra csábítják az agresszív szerepéből fakadó látszatelőnyök s az orgazmus önelégült magánya: nem mindig vállalja testét, s ezért nem is azonosul maradéktalanul vele. A nő önismerete mélyebb és autentikusabb.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
A második nem, Budapest, Gondolat, 1969.
„Egy szokás már-már társaság – mint ahogy egy ember társasága is gyakran csak egy megszokás.“
Simone de Beauvoir: A kor hatalma, Magvető, Bp., 1965. 119. p.
„To "catch" a husband is an art; to "hold" him is a job.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
Bk. 2, part 5, Ch. 1: The Married Woman, p. 468
Forrás: The Second Sex (1949)
„She was ready to deny the existence of space and time rather than admit that love might not be eternal.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Mandarins
Forrás: The Mandarins
„I am incapable of conceiving infinity, and yet I do not accept finity. I want this adventure that is the context of my life to go on without end.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv La Vieillesse
Pt. 2, Ch. 2: Time, activity, history, p. 412
The Coming of Age (1970)
Forrás: La Vieillesse
„One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
On ne naît pas femme: on le devient.
Bk. 2, Pt.. 4, Ch. 1: Childhood, p. 267
Forrás: The Second Sex (1949)
„In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
Part I : Ambiguity and Freedom
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947)
Kontextus: The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. Man, Sartre tells us, is “a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.” That means, first of all, that his passion is not inflicted upon him from without. He chooses it. It is his very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because there exists no absolute value before the passion of man, outside of it, in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful. The word “useful” has not yet received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated. It can be defined only in the human world established by man’s projects and the ends he sets up. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that the passion to which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being called useful. It has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it can not justify itself, that it can not give itself reasons for being that it does not have. And indeed Sartre tells us that man makes himself this lack of being in order that there might be being. The term in order that clearly indicates an intentionality. It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.
„It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
Part I : Ambiguity and Freedom
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947)
Kontextus: The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. Man, Sartre tells us, is “a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.” That means, first of all, that his passion is not inflicted upon him from without. He chooses it. It is his very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because there exists no absolute value before the passion of man, outside of it, in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful. The word “useful” has not yet received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated. It can be defined only in the human world established by man’s projects and the ends he sets up. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that the passion to which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being called useful. It has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it can not justify itself, that it can not give itself reasons for being that it does not have. And indeed Sartre tells us that man makes himself this lack of being in order that there might be being. The term in order that clearly indicates an intentionality. It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.
