Simone de Beauvoir idézet
Simone de Beauvoir
Születési dátum: 9. január 1908
Halál dátuma: 14. április 1986
Más nevek: Simone De Beauvoirová
Simone de Beauvoir francia írónő, filozófus. A 20. század második felének egyik népszerű, meghatározó feminista, egzisztencialista gondolkodója. Nagy hatással volt a második világháború után megerősödött fogyasztói, jóléti társadalomban felnövő ifjúságára. Legismertebb könyve, A második nem részletes elemzése a nők elnyomásának, a feminizmus egyik alapműve, és a feminizmus második hullámának elindítója. Irodalmi tevékenysége is említésre méltó, több regény és esszé szerzője.
Művek
Idézetek Simone de Beauvoir
„Kevés emberi élmény tárja fel megragadóbban az emberi sors kétértelműségét, mint a szexuális tapasztalat, melynek során egyszerre s együtt érzi magát testnek és léleknek, szubjektumnak és Másiknak. Az ebből fakadó konfliktus a nő esetében szükségszerűen élesebb, mint a férfinál, mert kezdetben kénytelen tárgyként megragadni önmagát, s nehezen leli fel szilárd autonómiáját a gyönyörben: ehhez előbb vissza kell hódítania szabad és transzcendens szubjektuma elvesztett méltóságát, de úgy, hogy egyidejűleg vállalja és betöltse a sorsot, melyre teste rendeli. Ez nehéz és kockázatos vállalkozás, sokszor kudarcba is fullad. De a nőt éppen helyzetének ellentmondásossága óvja meg az önáltatás csapdáitól, melyekbe a férfi oly gyakran beleesik, mert tévútra csábítják az agresszív szerepéből fakadó látszatelőnyök s az orgazmus önelégült magánya: nem mindig vállalja testét, s ezért nem is azonosul maradéktalanul vele. A nő önismerete mélyebb és autentikusabb.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
A második nem, Budapest, Gondolat, 1969.
„Egy szokás már-már társaság – mint ahogy egy ember társasága is gyakran csak egy megszokás.“
— Simone de Beauvoir
Simone de Beauvoir: A kor hatalma, Magvető, Bp., 1965. 119. p.
„To "catch" a husband is an art; to "hold" him is a job.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
The Second Sex (1949), Bk. 2, part 5, Ch. 1: The Married Woman, p. 468
„I am incapable of conceiving infinity, and yet I do not accept finity. I want this adventure that is the context of my life to go on without end.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv La Vieillesse
The Coming of Age (1970), Pt. 2, Ch. 2: Time, activity, history, p. 412
„One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv A második nem
The Second Sex (1949), On ne naît pas femme: on le devient.
Bk. 2, Pt.. 4, Ch. 1: Childhood, p. 267
„Self-knowledge is no guarantee of happiness, but it is on the side of happiness and can supply the courage to fight for it.“
— Simone de Beauvoir
General sources, Context: Self-knowledge is no guarantee of happiness, but it is on the side of happiness and can supply the courage to fight for it. Psychiatrists have told me that they give The Second Sex to their women patients to read, and not merely to intellectual women but to lower-middle-class women, to office workers and women working in factories. 'Your book was a great help to me. Your book saved me,' are the words I have read in letters from women of all ages and all walks of life.
If my book has helped women, it is because it expressed them, and they in their turn gave it its truth. Thanks to them, it is no longer a matter for scandal and concern. During these last ten years the myths that men created have crumbled, and many women writers have gone beyond me and have been far more daring than I. Too many of them for my taste take sexuality as their only theme; but at least when they write about it they now present themselves as the eye-that-looks, as subject, consciousness, freedom.
Force of Circumstances Vol. III (1963) as translated by Richard Howard (1968)
„This justification, though open upon the entire universe through time and space, will always be finite.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), Context: In Plato, art is mystification because there is the heaven of Ideas; but in the earthly domain all glorification of the earth is true as soon as it is realized. Let men attach value to words, forms, colors, mathematical theorems, physical laws, and athletic prowess; let them accord value to one another in love and friendship, and the objects, the events, and the men immediately have this value; they have it absolutely. It is possible that a man may refuse to love anything on earth; he will prove this refusal and he will carry it out by suicide. If he lives, the reason is that, whatever he may say, there still remains in him some attachment to existence; his life will be commensurate with this attachment; it will justify itself to the extent that it genuinely justifies the world.
This justification, though open upon the entire universe through time and space, will always be finite. Whatever one may do, one never realizes anything but a limited work, like existence itself which tries to establish itself through that work and which death also limits. It is the assertion of our finiteness which doubtless gives the doctrine which we have just evoked its austerity and, in some eyes, its sadness. As soon as one considers a system abstractly and theoretically, one puts himself, in effect, on the plane of the universal, thus, of the infinite. … existentialism does not offer to the reader the consolations of an abstract evasion: existentialism proposes no evasion. On the contrary, its ethics is experienced in the truth of life, and it then appears as the only proposition of salvation which one can address to men. Taking on its own account Descartes’ revolt against the evil genius, the pride of the thinking reed in the face of the universe which crushes him, it asserts that, despite his limits, through them, it is up to each one to fulfill his existence as an absolute. Regardless of the staggering dimensions of the world about us, the density of our ignorance, the risks of catastrophes to come, and our individual weakness within the immense collectivity, the fact remains that we are absolutely free today if we choose to will our existence in its finiteness, a finiteness which is open on the infinite. And in fact, any man who has known real loves, real revolts, real desires, and real will knows quite well that he has no need of any outside guarantee to be sure of his goals; their certitude comes from his own drive. There is a very old saying which goes: “Do what you must, come what may.” That amounts to saying in a different way that the result is not external to the good will which fulfills itself in aiming at it. If it came to be that each man did what he must, existence would be saved in each one without there being any need of dreaming of a paradise where all would be reconciled in death.
Conclusion
„It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), Context: The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. Man, Sartre tells us, is “a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.” That means, first of all, that his passion is not inflicted upon him from without. He chooses it. It is his very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because there exists no absolute value before the passion of man, outside of it, in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful. The word “useful” has not yet received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated. It can be defined only in the human world established by man’s projects and the ends he sets up. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that the passion to which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being called useful. It has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it can not justify itself, that it can not give itself reasons for being that it does not have. And indeed Sartre tells us that man makes himself this lack of being in order that there might be being. The term in order that clearly indicates an intentionality. It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.
Part I : Ambiguity and Freedom
„In spite of so many stubborn lies, at every moment, at every opportunity, the truth comes to light, the truth of life and death, of my solitude and my bond with the world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the insignificance and the sovereign importance of each man and all men.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), Context: In spite of so many stubborn lies, at every moment, at every opportunity, the truth comes to light, the truth of life and death, of my solitude and my bond with the world, of my freedom and my servitude, of the insignificance and the sovereign importance of each man and all men. There was Stalingrad and there was Buchenwald, and neither of the two wipes out the other. Since we do not succeed in fleeing it, let us therefore try to look the truth in the face. Let us try to assume our fundamental ambiguity. It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw our strength to live and our reason for acting [C'est dans la connaissance des conditions authentiques de notre vie qu'il nous faut puiser la force de vivre et des raisons d'agir].
Part I : Ambiguity and Freedom
„The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), Context: The failure described in Being and Nothingness is definitive, but it is also ambiguous. Man, Sartre tells us, is “a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.” That means, first of all, that his passion is not inflicted upon him from without. He chooses it. It is his very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness. If this choice is considered as useless, it is because there exists no absolute value before the passion of man, outside of it, in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful. The word “useful” has not yet received a meaning on the level of description where Being and Nothingness is situated. It can be defined only in the human world established by man’s projects and the ends he sets up. In the original helplessness from which man surges up, nothing is useful, nothing is useless. It must therefore be understood that the passion to which man has acquiesced finds no external justification. No outside appeal, no objective necessity permits of its being called useful. It has no reason to will itself. But this does not mean that it can not justify itself, that it can not give itself reasons for being that it does not have. And indeed Sartre tells us that man makes himself this lack of being in order that there might be being. The term in order that clearly indicates an intentionality. It is not in vain that man nullifies being. Thanks to him, being is disclosed and he desires this disclosure. There is an original type of attachment to being which is not the relationship “wanting to be” but rather “wanting to disclose being.” Now, here there is not failure, but rather success.
Part I : Ambiguity and Freedom
„This does not mean that one should consent to failure, but rather one must consent to struggle against it without respite.“
— Simone de Beauvoir, könyv The Ethics of Ambiguity
The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947), Context: A conquest of this kind is never finished; the contingency remains, and, so that he may assert his will, man is even obliged to stir up in the world the outrage he does not want. But this element of failure is a very condition of his life; one can never dream of eliminating it without immediately dreaming of death. This does not mean that one should consent to failure, but rather one must consent to struggle against it without respite.
Conclusion
