Ludwig Wittgenstein idézet

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Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások

Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások

Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások

Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások

Logika-filozófiai vizsgálódások

ezek voltak utolsó szavai

1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Kontextus: This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 50e

Forrás: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy (chapters 86–93 of the so called Big Typescript), p. 161
Corresponding to TS 213, Kapitel 86
Kontextus: What makes a subject difficult to understand — if it is significant, important — is not that some special instruction about abstruse things is necessary to understand it. Rather it is the contrast between the understanding of the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand. What has to be overcome is not difficulty of the intellect but of the will. [Nicht eine Schwierigkeit des Verstandes, sondern des Willens ist zu überwinden. ]

On Certainty (1969)
Kontextus: 105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life.

On Certainty (1969)

Conversation of 1947 or 1948
Personal Recollections (1981)

Forrás: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 7 : Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, p. 123
Kontextus: A religious symbol does not rest on any opinion. And error belongs only with opinion. One would like to say: This is what took place here; laugh, if you can.

Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 50e

1.1
Original German: Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

Forrás: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 185

Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 50e
Kontextus: A hero looks death in the face, real death, not just the image of death. Behaving honourably in a crisis doesn't mean being able to act the part of a hero well, as in the theatre, it means being able to look death itself in the eye.
For an actor may play lots of different roles, but at the end of it all he himself, the human being, is the one who has to die.

On Certainty (1969)
Kontextus: 105. All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all our arguments; no it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which our arguments have their life.

Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 5e
Kontextus: Man has to awaken to wonder — and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again.

§ 454
Philosophical Investigations (1953)
Kontextus: "Everything is already there in...." How does it come about that [an] arrow points? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something besides itself? — "No, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that." — That is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it.

Forrás: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 7 : Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough, p. 131
Kontextus: Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages, for they are not as far removed from the understanding of spiritual matter as a twentieth-century Englishman. His explanations of primitive practices are much cruder than the meaning of these practices themselves.

On Certainty (1969)
Kontextus: 144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I. e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.

On Certainty (1969)

Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Kontextus: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

7
Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.
Also: About what one can not speak, one must remain silent. (7)
Forrás: 1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

The microcosm.
5.63
Original German: Ich bin meine welt (Der Mikrokosmos.)
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Változat: Man is the microcosm:
I am my world.

Változat: If people never did silly things nothing intelligent would ever get done.
Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 50e

Forrás: Culture and Value (1980), p. 42e

Forrás: On Certainty (1969)

Forrás: Philosophical Investigations

Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache.
§ 109
Forrás: Philosophical Investigations (1953)