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The evolution of cooperation

The evolution of cooperation

A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.


“Change the payoffs.”

A common reaction of someone caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma is that "there ought to be a law against this sort of thing."

In fact, getting out of Prisoner's Dilemmas is one of the primary functions of government: to make sure that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway. Laws are passed to cause people to pay their taxes, not to steal, and to honor contracts with strangers. Each of these activities could be regarded as a giant Prisoner's Dilemma game with many players.

Chap. 7 : How to Promote Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals either.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 7.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 6.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“ALL D is always collectively stable.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 5.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 3.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.”

Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

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