“The philosopher … subjects experience to his critical judgment, and this contains a value judgment — namely, that freedom from toil is preferable to toil, and an intelligent life is preferable to a stupid life. It so happened that philosophy was born with these values. Scientific thought had to break this union of value judgment and analysis, for it became increasingly clear that the philosophic values did not guide the organisation of society.”

— Herbert Marcuse , book One-Dimensional Man

Source: One-Dimensional Man (1964), p. 126

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Herbert Marcuse 105

German philosopher, sociologist, and political theorist 1898–1979

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