“That no man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services; which, not being descendible, neither ought the offices of magistrate, legislator, or judge to be hereditary.”

— George Mason

Article 4
Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776)

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George Mason 54

American delegate from Virginia to the U.S. Constitutional … 1725–1792

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