Robert Axelrod Quotes

Robert Marshall Axelrod is an American political scientist. He is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Michigan where he has been since 1974. He is best known for his interdisciplinary work the evolution of cooperation, which has been cited in numerous articles. His current research interests include complexity theory , international security, and cyber security. Axelrod is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Axelrod is also a Senior Fellow at ARTIS International. Wikipedia  

✵ 27. May 1943

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Robert Axelrod: 15   quotes 0   likes

Famous Robert Axelrod Quotes

“In complex environments, individuals are not fully able to analyze the situation and calculate their optimal strategy. Instead they can be expected to adapt their strategy over time based upon what has been effective and what has not.”

Chap. 1 : Evolving New Strategies

Adapted from Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, ed. Lawrence Davis (London: Pitman; Los Altos, Calif.: Morgan Kaufman, 1987)
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)

“Change the payoffs.”

A common reaction of someone caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma is that "there ought to be a law against this sort of thing."

In fact, getting out of Prisoner's Dilemmas is one of the primary functions of government: to make sure that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway. Laws are passed to cause people to pay their taxes, not to steal, and to honor contracts with strangers. Each of these activities could be regarded as a giant Prisoner's Dilemma game with many players.

Chap. 7 : How to Promote Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

Robert Axelrod Quotes

“If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals either.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 7.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 6.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“ALL D is always collectively stable.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 5.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.”

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 3.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.”

Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

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