“One swallow does not make a summer,
neither does one fine day;
similarly one day or brief time of happiness does not make a person entirely happy.”

— Aristotle , book Nicomachean Ethics

Source: The Nicomachean Ethics

Last update April 14, 2023. History

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Aristotle 230

Classical Greek philosopher, student of Plato and founder o… -384–-321 BC

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