“Our methods may seem strange and indirect. Even incomprehensible. But I assure you we know what we're doing.”

Alvaro De Rujula, quoted in "Large Hadron Collider - The Search For The Higgs" http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XbKZwXK-3c; this quote can be heard at approximately 3:55 to 4:15 in the video. It is important to note, it could be taken out of context. It implies that science is what we use when we do not know the answer to something.

Source: Short fiction, Companions on the Road (1975), Chapter 9, “The Dark” (p. 98)

F160
Aphorisms (1765-1799), Notebook F (1776-1779)

Solar Lottery (1955)

"Professions for Women"
The Death of the Moth and Other Essays (1942)

Free Speech and Plain Language (1936)
Context: In general I wish we were in the habit of conveying our meanings in plain explicit terms rather than by indirection and by euphemism, as we so regularly do. My point is that habitual indirection in speech supports and stimulates a habit of indirection in thought; and this habit, if not pretty closely watched, runs off into intellectual dishonesty.
The English language is of course against us. Its vocabulary is so large, it is so rich in synonyms, it lends itself so easily and naturally to paraphrase, that one gets up a great facility with indirection almost without knowing it. Our common speech bristles with mere indirect intimations of what we are driving at; and as for euphemisms, they have so far corrupted our vernacular as to afflict us with a chronic, mawkish and self-conscious sentimentalism which violently resents the plain English name of the realities that these euphemisms intimate. This is bad; the upshot of our willingness to accept a reality, provided we do not hear it named, or provided we ourselves are not obliged to name it, leads us to accept many realities that we ought not to accept. It leads to many and serious moral misjudgments of both facts and persons; in other words, it leads straight into a profound intellectual dishonesty.

Source: Roll of Thunder, Hear My Cry

Source: Pathfinder

The Ethics of Belief (1877), The Limits Of Inference
Context: p>We may believe what goes beyond our experience, only when it is inferred from that experience by the assumption that what we do not know is like what we know. We may believe the statement of another person, when there is reasonable ground for supposing that he knows the matter of which he speaks, and that he is speaking the truth so far as he knows it.It is wrong in all cases to believe on insufficient evidence; and where it is presumption to doubt and to investigate, there it is worse than presumption to believe.</p