“Starting from a logically clear concept of probability, based on experience, using arguments which are usually called statistical, we can discover truth in wide domains of human interest.”

—  Richard von Mises

Sixth Lecture, Statistical Problems in Physics, p. 220
Probability, Statistics And Truth - Second Revised English Edition - (1957)

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Richard von Mises 20
Austrian physicist and mathematician 1883–1953

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