“Logic is a poor model of cause and effect.”
Source: Mind and Nature: A Necessary Unity, 1979, Chapter 2, section 13 as cited in: Gregory Bateson (1988) Mind and nature: a necessary unity. p. 134
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Gregory Bateson49
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Context: I am inclined to doubt that anything very resembling formal logic could be a good model for human reasoning. In particular, I doubt that any logic that prohibits self-reference can be adequate for psychology: no mind can have enough power — without the power to think about Thinking itself. Without Self-Reference it would seem immeasurably harder to achieve Self-Consciousness — which, so far as I can see, requires at least some capacity to reflect on what it does. If Russell shattered our hopes for making a completely reliable version of commonsense reasoning, still we can try to find the islands of "local consistency," in which naive reasoning remains correct.