Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon: Trending quotes

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“I do not know how far I ought to sit here and suffer a gentleman at the bar to bring forward parts of the Bible in this way. It is for you, gentlemen of the jury, to say whether you wish to hear them read.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Williams' Case (1797), 26 How. St. Tr. 683.

“The liberty of the press has always been, and has justly been, a favourite topic with Englishmen. They have looked at it with jealousy whenever it has been invaded; and though a licenser was put over the press, and was suffered to exist for some years after the coming of William, and after the revolution, yet the reluctant spirit of English liberty called for a repeal of that law; and from that time to this it has not been shackled and limited more than it ought to be.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Case of John Lambert and others (1793), 22 How. St. Tr. 1016.

“There are cases where examinations are admitted, namely, before the coroner, and before magistrates in cases of felony. That appears to me to go rather in support of the general rule than in destruction of it. Every exception that can be accounted for is so much a confirmation of the rule that it has become a maxim, Exceptio probat regulam.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

The King v. Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790), 3 T. R. 722.

“Precedent goes in support of justice.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Smith v. Bowles (1797), 2 Esp. 578.

“The common law, though not to be found in the written records of the realm, yet has been long well known. It is coeval with civilised society itself, and was formed from time to time by the wisdom of man. Good sense did not come with the Conquest, or at any other one time, but grew and increased from time to time with the wisdom of mankind.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Rex v. Rusby (1800), Peake's N. P. Cases, 193.

“No stops are ever inserted in Acts of Parliament, or in deeds; but the Courts of law, in construing them, must read them with such stops as will give effect to the whole.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Doe d. Willis and others v. Martin and others (1790), 4 T. R. 65.

“In many cases a party undertakes to prove a custom from the time of legal memory, the reign of Richard the Second; but that proof is generally established by evidence of acts done at a much later period, and frequently no evidence is given beyond the present century.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Withnell v. Gartham (1795), 6 T. R. 397.

“It was said by a very learned Judge, Lord Macclesfield, towards the beginning of this century that the most effectual way of removing land marks would be by innovating on the rules of evidence; and so I say. I have been in this profession more than forty years, and have practised both in Courts of law and equity; and if it had fallen to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, whether or not I should have thought it advisable to establish two different Courts with different jurisdictions, and governed by different rules, it is not necessary to say. But, influenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become inveterate with those who comply with the systems they found established, I find that in these Courts proceeding by different rules a certain combined system of jurisprudence has been framed most beneficial to the people of this country, and which I hope I may be indulged in supposing has never yet been equalled in any other country on earth. Our Courts of law only consider legal rights: our Courts of equity have other rules, by which they sometimes supersede those legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneficially for the subject. We all know that, if the Courts of law were to take into their consideration all the jurisdiction belonging to Courts of equity, many bad consequences would ensue. To mention only the single instance of legacies being left to women who may have married inadvertently: if a Court of law could entertain an action for a legacy, the husband would recover it, and the wife might be left destitute: but if it be necessary in such a case to go into equity, that Court will not suffer the husband alone to reap the fruits of the legacy given to the wife; for one of its rules is that he who asks equity must do equity, and in such a case they will compel the husband to make a provision for the wife before they will suffer him to get the money. I exemplify the propriety of keeping the jurisdictions and rules of the different Courts distinct by one out of a multitude of cases that might be adduced.... One of the rules of a Court of equity is that they cannot decree against the oath of the party himself on the evidence of one witness alone without other circumstances: but when the point is doubtful, they send it to be tried at law, directing that the answer of the party shall be read on the trial; so they may order that a party shall not set up a legal term on the trial, or that the plaintiff himself shall be examined; and when the issue comes from a Court of equity with any of these directions the Courts of law comply with the terms on which it is so directed to be tried. By these means the ends of justice are attained, without making any of the stubborn rules of law stoop to what is supposed to be the substantial justice of each particular case; and it is wiser so to act than to leave it to the Judges of the law to relax from those certain and established rules by which they are sworn to decide.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Bauerman v. Eadenius (1798), 7 T. R. 667.

“The popish religion is now unknown to the law of this country.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Du Barre v. Livette (1791), Peake's N. P. Cases, 79.

“It is sometimes difficult to get rid of first impressions.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Withnell v. Gartham (1795), 6 T. R. 396.

“It is our duty to take care that persons in pursuing their own particular interests do not transgress those laws which were made for the benefit of the whole community.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

King v. Waddington (1800), 1 East, 158.

“It is of great importance that the laws by which the contracts of so numerous and so useful a body of men as the sailors are supposed to be guided, should not be overturned.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Cutter v. Powell (1795), 6 T. R. 320.

“The power of free discussion is the right of every subject of this country. It is a right to the fair exercise of which we are indebted more than to any other that was ever claimed by Englishmen. All the blessings we at present enjoy might be ascribed to it.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

King v. Reeves (1796), Peake's Nisi Prius Cases, 85.

“To enter into the hearts of men belongs to him who can explore the human heart.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Eaton's Case (1793)

“The situation the Lord Mayor holds is the first officer of the first city in the world in point of commerce and riches, and everything that can constitute the magnificence of a city. He is a judicial officer, and a municipal officer too, and from these combined characters there are duties incumbent upon him, which by all the ties that can bind a man to the discharge of duty, he is bound to discharge. It stands at the head of his duties, next after protecting the religion which binds us to God, to govern that civil policy which binds government together, and prevents us from being a state of anarchy and confusion.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Eaton's Case (1793)

“Many people there are in this kingdom who never see a Gazette to the day of their deaths, and very mischievous would be the consequences if they were bound by a notice inserted in it.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Graham v. Hope (1794), 1 Peake, N. P. Ca. 155; reported in James William Norton-Kyshe, Dictionary of Legal Quotations (1904), p. 99.

“A Court of equity can mould interests differently from a Court of law; and can give relief in cases where a Court of law cannot.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Clayton v. Adams (1796), 6 T. R. 605.

“Really I wish I was more acquainted than I am, with the course of criminal jurisdiction—if the question had never been decided, I should have extreme doubts upon it, and those extreme doubts which I should have would lead me in a criminal case to do otherwise than I should do in a civil case—in every civil case [I speak in the hearing of a great many professional gentlemen] wherever I have serious doubts, I follow the doctrine which I have collected to be laid down by Lord Hardwicke; I receive the evidence, giving the jury the best instruction I can upon the effect of it; and I do it in the case of civil proceedings, without running the risk of doing any hurt, because if I receive it improperly, a season will come when the Court can correct my error.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Stone's Case (1796), 25 How. St. Tr. 1272.

“Equity will go no further than the law.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Tooke v. Hollingworth (1793), 5 T. R. 225.

“Though this motion for a new trial is an application to the discretion of the Court, it must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised on such an occasion is not a wild but a sound discretion, and to be confined within those limits within which an honest man, competent to discharge the duties of his office, ought to confine himself. And that discretion will be best exercised by not deviating from the rules laid down by our predecessors; for the practice of the Court forms the law of the Court.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Wilson v. Rastall (1792), 4 T. R. 757.