Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon: Quotes about justice

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon was British Baron. Explore interesting quotes on justice.
Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon: 184 quotes0 likes

“The learned counsel has very properly avoided all political discussions unconnected with the subject, and I shall follow his example. Courts of justice have nothing to do with them.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Trial of John Vint and others (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 640.

“I hope that there is no jealousy, or even ground of jealousy, on the part of the Americans, but that they know that when their rights come to be discussed here the greatest attention will be paid to their interests. They have long been acquainted with the habits of this country, and with the mode of administering justice here : until within these few years their causes used to come over here to be discussed, and I never heard that the decisions in our Courts ever awakened the least jealousy in the breasts of the inhabitants of that country.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Wilson v. Marryat (1798), 8 T. R. 44.

“It is necessary to the administration of justice that every person who is accused of a crime should have an opportunity of being heard in his defence against the charge of which he is accused.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

The King v. Justices of Surrey (1794), 6 T. R. 78.

“It is a rule that those who come into a Court of justice to seek redress, must come with clean hands, and must disclose a transaction warranted by law.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Petrie v. Hannay (1789), 3 T. R. 422.

“I have heard that it was the perfection of the administration of criminal justice to take care that the punishment should come to few and the example to many.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Eaton's Case (1793)

“Courts of equity make their decrees so as to arrive at the justice of the case without violating the rules of law.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Clayton v. Adams (1796), 6 T. R. 605.

“The natural leaning of our minds is in favour of prisoners; and in the mild manner in which the laws of this country are executed, it has rather been a subject of complaint by some that the Judges have given way too easily to mere formal objections on behalf of prisoners, and have been too ready on slight grounds to make favourable representations of their cases. Lord Hale himself, one of the greatest and best men who ever sat in judgment, considered this extreme facility as a great blemish, owing to which more offenders escaped than by the manifestation of their innocence." We must, however, take care not to carry this disposition too far, lest we loosen the bands of society, which is kept together by the hope of reward, and the fear of punishment. It has been always considered, that the Judges in our foreign possessions abroad were not bound by the rules of proceeding in our Courts here. Their laws are often altogether distinct from our own. Such is the case in India and other places. On appeals to the Privy Council from our colonies, no formal objections are attended to, if the substance of the matter or the corpus delicti sufficiently appear to enable them to get at the truth and justice of the case.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

King v. Suddis (1800), 1 East, 314. Lord Kenyon is later reported to have written, "I once before had occasion to refer to the opinion of a most eminent Judge, who was a great Crown lawyer, upon the subject, I mean Lord Hale; who even in his time lamented the too great strictness which had been required in indictments, and which had grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law; and observed that more offenders escaped by the over easy ear given to exceptions in indictments than by their own innocence". King v. Airey (c. 1800), 2 East, 34.

“It is a maxim in our law that a plaintiff must shew that he stands on a fair ground when he calls on a Court of justice to administer relief to him.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Booth v. Hodgson (1795), 6 T. R. 409.

“A plaintiff who comes into a Court of justice must show that he is in a condition to maintain his action.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Morton v. Lamb (1797), 7 T. R. 129.

“It is necessary for Courts of Justice to hold a strict hand over summary proceedings before magistrates, and I never will agree to relax any of the rules by which they have been bound. Their jurisdiction is of a limited nature, and they must shew that the party was brought within it.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

King v. Stone (1800), 1 East, 650.

“If an infant commit an assault, or utter slander, God forbid that he should not be answerable for it in a Court of justice.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Jennings v. Rundall (1799), 8 T.R. 337.

“It is the great duty of every Court of justice to administer justice as well as they can between the litigating parties; another, and not less material, duty is to satisfy those parties that the whole case has been examined and considered.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Booth v. Hodgson (1795), 6 T. R. 408.

“The wishes of every human man are, that guilt may not be fixed upon any man; but I confess I am one of those who have not the weakness—which weakness, a Judge at least, and a jury, must get rid of, before they fit themselves to fill the respective stations which they are to fill in the administration of the justice of the country— I say, therefore, I am not one of those who wish under false compassion, inconsistent with the administration of criminal justice, that a person on whom guilt is fairly fixed, should escape the punishment which the law annexes to his guilt.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Stone's Case (1796), 25 How. St. Tr. 1423.

“I should be extremely sorry to find that in a fictitious proceeding, instituted for the more easy attaining of justice, different rules were to obtain in the different Courts.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Goodright v. Rich (1797), 7 T. R. 334.

“Justice requires that a party should be duly summoned and fully heard before he is condemned.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

King v. Stone (1800), 1 East, 649.

“Precedent goes in support of justice.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Smith v. Bowles (1797), 2 Esp. 578.

“It was said by a very learned Judge, Lord Macclesfield, towards the beginning of this century that the most effectual way of removing land marks would be by innovating on the rules of evidence; and so I say. I have been in this profession more than forty years, and have practised both in Courts of law and equity; and if it had fallen to my lot to form a system of jurisprudence, whether or not I should have thought it advisable to establish two different Courts with different jurisdictions, and governed by different rules, it is not necessary to say. But, influenced as I am by certain prejudices that have become inveterate with those who comply with the systems they found established, I find that in these Courts proceeding by different rules a certain combined system of jurisprudence has been framed most beneficial to the people of this country, and which I hope I may be indulged in supposing has never yet been equalled in any other country on earth. Our Courts of law only consider legal rights: our Courts of equity have other rules, by which they sometimes supersede those legal rules, and in so doing they act most beneficially for the subject. We all know that, if the Courts of law were to take into their consideration all the jurisdiction belonging to Courts of equity, many bad consequences would ensue. To mention only the single instance of legacies being left to women who may have married inadvertently: if a Court of law could entertain an action for a legacy, the husband would recover it, and the wife might be left destitute: but if it be necessary in such a case to go into equity, that Court will not suffer the husband alone to reap the fruits of the legacy given to the wife; for one of its rules is that he who asks equity must do equity, and in such a case they will compel the husband to make a provision for the wife before they will suffer him to get the money. I exemplify the propriety of keeping the jurisdictions and rules of the different Courts distinct by one out of a multitude of cases that might be adduced.... One of the rules of a Court of equity is that they cannot decree against the oath of the party himself on the evidence of one witness alone without other circumstances: but when the point is doubtful, they send it to be tried at law, directing that the answer of the party shall be read on the trial; so they may order that a party shall not set up a legal term on the trial, or that the plaintiff himself shall be examined; and when the issue comes from a Court of equity with any of these directions the Courts of law comply with the terms on which it is so directed to be tried. By these means the ends of justice are attained, without making any of the stubborn rules of law stoop to what is supposed to be the substantial justice of each particular case; and it is wiser so to act than to leave it to the Judges of the law to relax from those certain and established rules by which they are sworn to decide.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Bauerman v. Eadenius (1798), 7 T. R. 667.

“I desire that after I have given the judgment of the Court, that judgment may not be talked about; I have given it upon my oath, and am answerable to my country for it. I have been before reminded that these things are not passing in a corner, but in the open face of the world; I hope I need not be admonished that I am to administer justice; if I have done amiss, let the wrath and indignation of Parliament be brought out against me; let me be impeached; I am ready to meet the storm whenever it comes, having at least one protection; the consciousness that I am right. In protecting the dignity of the Court, I do the best thing I can do for the public: for if my conduct here is extra-judicially arraigned, the administration of justice is arraigned and affronted, and that no man living shall do with impunity.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Proceedings against the Dean of St. Asaph (1783), 21 How. St. Tr. 875.

“I have been reminded that I sit here as counsel for the defendant. I certainly do so, so far as to interpose between him and the counsel for the prosecution, and to see that no improper use of the law is made against him, and that no improper evidence is given to the jury: but the Judge has another task to perform, which is that of assisting the jury in the administration of justice.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Wakefield's Case (1799), 27 How. St. Tr. 736.

“No person is less disposed than I am to accommodate the law to the particular convenience of the case: but I am always glad when I find the strict law and the justice of the case going hand in hand together.”

Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Peaceable v. Read and others (1801), 1 East. 573.