More concretely, North Korea wants to force Washington into a grand bargain linking de-nuclearization to the withdrawal of U.S. troops. South Korea would then be pressured into a North-South confederation, which is a concept the South Korean left has flirted with for years, and which the North has always seen as a transition to unification under its own control.
2010s, Interview with the Reuters War College (April 2017)
2010s, On Experts and Exegetes (September 2017)
Remarks to the U.S. Congress (November 2017)
“735 days in North Korea was long enough. But I’m thankful.”
Kenneth Bae: ‘735 days in North Korea was long enough’ https://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2016/june/kenneth-bae-my-story-of-faith-in-north-korean-prison-camp.html (May 2, 2016)
Radio interview http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/196/48554/, The Glenn Beck Program, , quoted in * 2010-11-24
Sarah Palin: 'We've got to stand with our North Korean allies'
Richard Adams's Blog
The Guardian
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/richard-adams-blog/2010/nov/24/sarah-palin-north-korea-allies
2014
Interview with George Gurley in The New York Observer (10 January 2005).
2005
"The Palace of the End" (2003)
Context: It was explained that the North Korean matter was a diplomatic inconvenience, while Iraq's non-disarmament remained a "crisis". The reason was strategic: even without WMDs, North Korea could inflict a million casualties on its southern neighbour and raze Seoul. Iraq couldn't manage anything on this scale, so you could attack it. North Korea could, so you couldn't. The imponderables of the proliferation age were becoming ponderable. Once a nation has done the risky and nauseous work of acquisition, it becomes unattackable. A single untested nuclear weapon may be a liability. But five or six constitute a deterrent. From this it crucially follows that we are going to war with Iraq because it doesn't have weapons of mass destruction. Or not many. The surest way by far of finding out what Iraq has is to attack it. Then at last we will have Saddam's full cooperation in our weapons inspection, because everything we know about him suggests that he will use them all. The Pentagon must be more or less convinced that Saddam's WMDs are under a certain critical number. Otherwise it couldn't attack him.
How the world's hot-spots are turning into Cold Wars..., JohannHari.com, July 27, 2006, 2007-01-26 http://www.johannhari.com/archive/article.php?id=645,
There, as in Weimar Germany, the state is seen as having betrayed the race. When Moon Jae-in looks back on the history of the ROK he holds up only the anti-state riots and protests as high points.
2010s, Interview with Joshua Stanton (August 2017)
“North Korea has to inspire its people and so far it's done that.”
2010s, Interview with Chad O'Carroll (2012)
2010s, North Korea's State Loyalty Advantage (December 2011)
Context: Korea's northern border remains easy to cross, and North Koreans are now well aware of the prosperity enjoyed south of the demilitarized zone, Kim Jong-il continues to rule over a stable and supportive population. Kim enjoys mass support due to his perceived success in strengthening the race and humiliating its enemies. Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethno-nationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race. South Koreans' "good race, bad state" attitude is reflected in widespread sympathy for the people of the north and in ambivalent feelings toward the United States and Japan, which are regarded as friends of the republic but enemies of the race.
