“We have now isolated four "ideal types" of causal texture, approximations to which may be thought of as existing simultaneously in the "real world" of most organizations--though, of course, their weighting will vary enormously from case to case.”
Source: The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments (1963), p. 27.
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Fred Emery 15
Australian psychologist 1925–1997Related quotes
Ex parte Rev. James Bell Cox (1887), L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 19.
“The next level of causal texturing we have called the disturbed reactive environment.”
It may be compared with Ashby's ultra-stable system or the economists' oligopolic market.
Source: The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments (1963), p. 29.
Max Weber, The Nature of Social Action, 1922
Source: The Causal Texture of Organizational Environments (1963), p. 29.
Source: The German Ideology (1845-1846), Vol. I, Part 1.
Remarks after the Solvay Conference (1927)
Context: I consider those developments in physics during the last decades which have shown how problematical such concepts as "objective" and "subjective" are, a great liberation of thought. The whole thing started with the theory of relativity. In the past, the statement that two events are simultaneous was considered an objective assertion, one that could be communicated quite simply and that was open to verification by any observer. Today we know that 'simultaneity' contains a subjective element, inasmuch as two events that appear simultaneous to an observer at rest are not necessarily simultaneous to an observer in motion. However, the relativistic description is also objective inasmuch as every observer can deduce by calculation what the other observer will perceive or has perceived. For all that, we have come a long way from the classical ideal of objective descriptions.
In quantum mechanics the departure from this ideal has been even more radical. We can still use the objectifying language of classical physics to make statements about observable facts. For instance, we can say that a photographic plate has been blackened, or that cloud droplets have formed. But we can say nothing about the atoms themselves. And what predictions we base on such findings depend on the way we pose our experimental question, and here the observer has freedom of choice. Naturally, it still makes no difference whether the observer is a man, an animal, or a piece of apparatus, but it is no longer possible to make predictions without reference to the observer or the means of observation. To that extent, every physical process may be said to have objective and subjective features. The objective world of nineteenth-century science was, as we know today, an ideal, limiting case, but not the whole reality. Admittedly, even in our future encounters with reality we shall have to distinguish between the objective and the subjective side, to make a division between the two. But the location of the separation may depend on the way things are looked at; to a certain extent it can be chosen at will. Hence I can quite understand why we cannot speak about the content of religion in an objectifying language. The fact that different religions try to express this content in quite distinct spiritual forms is no real objection. Perhaps we ought to look upon these different forms as complementary descriptions which, though they exclude one another, are needed to convey the rich possibilities flowing from man's relationship with the central order.
As quoted in Learned Hand : The Man and the Judge (1994) by Gerald Gunther.
Extra-judicial writings
p, 125
"On the Harmony of Theory and Practice in Mechanics" (Jan. 3, 1856)