Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) American sociologist
Preface second edition, 1949
The structure of social action (1937)
Source: Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences, 1883, p. 147
Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) American sociologist
Preface second edition, 1949
The structure of social action (1937)
Gunnar Myrdal (1898–1987) Swedish economist
Gunnar Myrdal (1982, 265); as cited in: Carlson, Benny, and Lars Jonung. "Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Bertil Ohlin and Gunnar Myrdal on the role of the economist in public debate." Econ Journal Watch 3.3 (2006): p. 534-5
George Klir (1932–2016) American computer scientist
Source: Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic (1995), p. 312 as cited in: William Siler, James J. Buckley (2005) Fuzzy Expert Systems and Fuzzy Reasoning. p. 36.
Ragnar Frisch (1895–1973) Norwegian economist
Frisch, (1946, p. 1), as quoted in: " Ragnar Frisch 1895-1995 https://www.ssb.no/a/histstat/doc/doc_199403.pdf." O. Bjerkholt, 1994. <br class="br">1940-60s
“The most important tool of the theoretical physicist is his wastebasket.”
Albert Einstein (1879–1955) German-born physicist and founder of the theory of relativity
Told by P. Morrison
Attributed in posthumous publications, Albert Einstein: A guide for the perplexed (1979)
John Harsanyi (1920–2000) hungarian economist
Source: "Games with Incomplete Information," 1997, p. 136
Karl William Kapp (1910–1976) American economist
Source: Social Costs of Business Enterprise, 1963, p. 186 cited in: Sebastian Berger and Mathew Forstater (2007) "Toward a Political Institutionalist Economics: Kapp’s Social Costs, Lowe’s Instrumental Analysis, and the European Institutionalist Approach to Environmental Policy". In: Journal of Economic Issues. Vol.XLI, No.2, June 2007. p. 539
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) American philosopher, logician, mathematician, and scientist
Lecture II : The Universal Categories, §3. Laws: Nominalism, CP 5.61
Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (1903)
Context: Philosophy, as I understand the word, is a positive theoretical science, and a science in an early stage of development. As such it has no more to do with belief than any other science. Indeed, I am bound to confess that it is at present in so unsettled a condition, that if the ordinary theorems of molecular physics and of archaeology are but the ghosts of beliefs, then to my mind, the doctrines of the philosophers are little better than the ghosts of ghosts. I know this is an extremely heretical opinion.
Jürgen Habermas book Knowledge and Human Interests
Source: Knowledge and Human Interests, 1971, p. 310 as cited in: Dominick LaCapra (1983) Rethinking Intellectual History: Texts, Contexts, Language. p. 170