“Reason does not scream. Reason convinces.”
Luis A. Ferré (1904–2003) American politician
La razón no grita, la razón convence.
Attribution inscribed on the memorial statue in the Puerto Rican Capitol (see right).
Attributed
“Reason does not scream. Reason convinces.”
Luis A. Ferré (1904–2003) American politician
La razón no grita, la razón convence.
Attribution inscribed on the memorial statue in the Puerto Rican Capitol (see right).
Attributed
John Coleridge, 1st Baron Coleridge (1820–1894) British lawyer, judge and Liberal politician
Dublin, &c. Rail. Co. v. Slattery (1878), L. R. 3 App. Ca. 1197.
“As Hegel well knew, the ascent of reason has never followed a straight line.”
Paul A. Baran (1909–1964) American Marxist economist
Source: The Political Economy Of Growth (1957), Chapter Eight, The Steep Ascent, p. 298
“The heart has its reasons, which reason does not know.”
James Thurber (1894–1961) American cartoonist, author, journalist, playwright
Cartoon caption, The New Yorker (27 July 1935)
Borrowing from Blaise Pascal, Pensées, 1670 (published posthumously): ""Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point""
Cartoon captions
Johann Gottlieb Fichte book The Vocation of Man
Jane Sinnett, trans 1846 p.94
The Vocation of Man (1800), Faith
“Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge of the reason for the fact.”
Aristotle book Posterior Analytics
I. 13, 78a.22
Posterior Analytics
Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716) German mathematician and philosopher
Il y a aussi deux sortes de vérités, celles de Raisonnement et celle de Fait. Les vérités de Raisonnement sont nécessaires et leur opposé est impossible, et celles de Fait sont contingentes et leur opposé est possible.
La monadologie (33).
The Monadology (1714)
Henri Poincaré book Science and Hypothesis
Source: Science and Hypothesis (1901), Ch. I: On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning (1905) Tr. https://books.google.com/books?id=5nQSAAAAYAAJ George Bruce Halstead <br class="br">Context: The very possibility of the science of mathematics seems an insoluble contradiction. If this science is deductive only in appearance, whence does it derive that perfect rigor no one dreams of doubting? If, on the contrary, all the propositions it enunciates can be deduced one from another by the rules of formal logic, why is not mathematics reduced to an immense tautology? The syllogism can teach us nothing essentially new, and, if everything is to spring from the principle of identity, everything should be capable of being reduced to it. Shall we then admit that the enunciations of all those theorems which fill so many volumes are nothing but devious ways of saying A is A!... Does the mathematical method proceed from particular to the general, and, if so, how can it be called deductive?... If we refuse to admit these consequences, it must be conceded that mathematical reasoning has of itself a sort of creative virtue and consequently differs from a syllogism.<!--pp.5-6