
Speech at the Cambridge Union (March 1924), quoted in On England, and Other Addresses (1926), pp. 94-95.
1924
after 2000, Gerhard Richter: An Artist Beyond Isms' (2002)
Speech at the Cambridge Union (March 1924), quoted in On England, and Other Addresses (1926), pp. 94-95.
1924
Speech at the Cambridge Union (March 1924), quoted in On England, and Other Addresses (1926), pp. 95-96.
1924
Source: Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), pp. 31-32
Context: In the second part of the Phaedrus Plato attempts to clarify the nature of “true” rhetoric. … it does not arise from a posterior unity which presupposes the duality of ratio and passio, but illuminates and influences the passions through its original, imaginative characters. Thus philosophy is not a posterior synthesis of pathos and logos but the original unity of the two under the power of the original archai. Plato sees true rhetoric as psychology which can fulfill its truly “moving” function only if it masters original images [eide]. Thus the true philosophy is rhetoric, and the true rhetoric is philosophy, a philosophy which does not need an “external” rhetoric to convince, and a rhetoric that does not need an “external” content of verity.
“I think my rhetoric is a very – it brings people together.”
Quoted by * 2019-08-07
While slamming critics, Trump says his words ‘bring people together’
Steve Benen
MSNBC
http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/while-slamming-critics-trump-says-his-words-bring-people-together
2019, August 2019
In the 'First Futurist Manifesto,' Filippo Marinetti, 1909; as quoted in Critical Writings: Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, New Edition, quoted in the text on the Back Cover, Macmillan, 7 Apr 2007
1900's
“Darkrose and Diamond” (p. 125)
Earthsea Books, Tales from Earthsea (2001)
Source: Quotes From Judge Judy Cases, Dress, Stand, and/or Speak Properly
“The Phaedrus and the Nature of Rhetoric,” p. 23.
The Ethics of Rhetoric (1953)
The fundamental argument of Plato’s critique of rhetoric usually is exemplified by the thesis, maintained, among other things, in the Gorgias, that only he who "knows" [epistatai] can speak correctly; for what would be the use of the "beautiful," of the rhetorical speech, if it merely sprang from opinions [doxa], hence from not knowing? … Plato’s … rejection of rhetoric, when understood in this manner, assumes that Plato rejects every emotive element in the realm of knowledge. But in several of his dialogues Plato connects the philosophical process, for example, with eros, which would lead to the conclusion that he attributes a decisive role to the emotive, seen even in philosophy as the absolute science.
Source: Rhetoric as Philosophy (1980), p. 28