“We have seen that Rawls’ theory of justice requires for its coherence a conception of community in the constitutive sense, which requires in turn a notion of agency in the cognitive sense, and we have hound that Rawls’ theory of the good can allow for neither. This calls into question the theory of justice, or the thoery of the good, or both.”

—  Michael J. Sandel , book Liberalism and the Limits of Justice

Ch 4. Justice and the Good
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 1998

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American political philosopher 1953

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