Internationale Situationist (no. 1, Paris, June 1958).
“If the State, modeled after the universe, is split into two spheres or classes of beings – wherein the free represent the ideas and the unfree the concrete and sensate things – then the ultimate and uppermost order remains unrealized by both. By using sensate things as tools or organs, the ideas obtain a direct relationship to the apparitions and enter into them as souls. God, however, as identity of the highest order, remains above all reality and eternally has merely an indirect relationship. If then in the higher moral order the State represents a second nature, then the divine can never have anything other than an indirect relationship to it, never can it bear any real relationship to it, and religion, if it seeks to preserve itself in unscathed pure ideality, can therefore never exist – even in the most perfect State – other than esoterically in the form of mystery cults. P. 51”
Philosophy and Religion 1804)
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Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling 12
German philosopher (idealism) 1775–1854Related quotes
Source: The Mind and the Brain, 1907, p. 13-14
Source: What is to be Done? (1902), Chapter Three, Section D, Essential Works of Lenin (1966)
“The strength of ideas rests on their relationship to reality.”
                                        
                                         "MacKinnon's Textual Harassment" http://www.unz.org/Pub/AmConservative-2006jan16-00033 The American Conservative, January 16, 2006. 
2000s, 2006
                                    
“The person must give himself an external sphere of freedom in order to have being as Idea.”
                                        
                                        Die Person muß sich eine äußere Sphäre ihrer Freiheit geben, um als Idee zu sein. 
Sect. 41 
Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820/1821)
                                    
                                        
                                        Dialogues on Metaphysics (1688) Dialogue III 
Context: I am unable, when I turn to myself, to recognize any of my faculties or my capacities. The inner sensation which I have of myself informs me that I am, that I think, that I will, that I have sensory awareness, that I suffer, and so on; but it provides me with no knowledge whatever of what I am — of the nature of my thought, my sensations, my passions, or my pain — or the mutual relations that obtain between all these things … I have no idea whatever of my soul.