“There is no case where ignorance should be preferred to knowledge — especially if the knowledge is terrible.”
As quoted in Forbidden Knowledge : From Prometheus to Pornography (1996) by Roger Shattuck, p. 177
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Edward Teller 32
Hungarian-American nuclear physicist 1908–2003Related quotes

Source: In Job's Balances: on the sources of the eternal truths, The Conquest of the Self-Evident; Dostoievsky’s Philosophy p. 3

“Where knowledge is a duty, ignorance is a crime.”
"Public Good" (December 1780) http://www.thomas-paine-friends.org/paine-thomas_public-good-1780.html.
1780s

“The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge.”

“The greatest enemy of knowledge is not ignorance. It is the illusion of knowledge.”
Sometimes attributed to Hawking without a source, but originally from historian Daniel J. Boorstin. It appears in different forms in The Discoverers (1983), Cleopatra's Nose (1995), and introduction to The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1995)
Misattributed

“Just as feelings grow out of ignorance, intuition should grow out of knowledge.”
Annotated Drawings by Eugene J. Martin: 1977-1978

1970's, Conversations with Samuel Beckett and Bram van Velde (1970 - 1972)

“Not ignorance, but ignorance of ignorance is the death of knowledge.”

Source: Sex, Art and American Culture : New Essays (1992), Junk Bonds and Corporate Raiders : Academe in the Hour of the Wolf, p. 224

The Ethics of Belief (1877), The Weight Of Authority
Context: In what cases, then, let us ask in the first place, is the testimony of a man unworthy of belief? He may say that which is untrue either knowingly or unknowingly. In the first case he is lying, and his moral character is to blame; in the second case he is ignorant or mistaken, and it is only his knowledge or his judgment which is in fault. In order that we may have the right to accept his testimony as ground for believing what he says, we must have reasonable grounds for trusting his veracity, that he is really trying to speak the truth so far as he knows it; his knowledge, that he has had opportunities of knowing the truth about this matter; and his judgment, that he has made proper use of those opportunities in coming to the conclusion which he affirms.
However plain and obvious these reasons may be, so that no man of ordinary intelligence, reflecting upon the matter, could fail to arrive at them, it is nevertheless true that a great many persons do habitually disregard them in weighing testimony. Of the two questions, equally important to the trustworthiness of a witness, "Is he dishonest?" and "May he be mistaken?" the majority of mankind are perfectly satisfied if one can, with some show of probability, be answered in the negative. The excellent moral character of a man is alleged as ground for accepting his statements about things which he cannot possibly have known.