Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957) Austrian-American psychoanalyst
Source: Beyond Psychology: Letters and Journals, 1934-1939
Source: Power and Innocence (1972), Ch. 8 : Ecstasy and Violence, p. 176
Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957) Austrian-American psychoanalyst
Source: Beyond Psychology: Letters and Journals, 1934-1939
Eli Siegel (1902–1978) Latvian-American poet, philosopher
Everything Has to Do with Hardness and Softness (1969)
Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) logician, one of the first analytic philosophers and political activist
An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (1940), Introduction, p. 15
1940s
Laurence Sterne book A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy
Montreuil.
A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy (1768)
Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864) American novelist and short story writer (1804 – 1879)
William Cowper Prime in The Old House by the River (1853); first misattributed to Hawthorne in Notable Thoughts about Women: A Literary Mosaic (1882) by Maturin Murray Ballou, p. 239
Misattributed
Wilhelm Von Humboldt (1767–1835) German (Prussian) philosopher, government functionary, diplomat, and founder of the University of Berlin
Source: The Limits of State Action (1792), Ch. 2
Erving Goffman book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life
Source: 1950s-1960s, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 1959, p. 229
John Stuart Mill book On Liberty
Source: On Liberty (1859), Ch. III: Of Individuality, As One of the Elements of Well-Being
Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) 16th President of the United States
Fragment on Government http://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln2/1:261?rgn=div1;view=fulltext (1 July 1854?) in "The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln", ed. Roy P. Basler, Vol. 2, pp. 220-221 <br class="br">1850s <br class="br">Context: The legitimate object of government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves - in their separate, and individual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government ought not to interfere. The desirable things which the individuals of a people can not do, or can not well do, for themselves, fall into two classes: those which have relation to wrongs, and those which have not. Each of these branch off into an infinite variety of subdivisions. The first - that in relation to wrongs - embraces all crimes, misdemeanors, and nonperformance of contracts. The other embraces all which, in its nature, and without wrong, requires combined action, as public roads and highways, public schools, charities, pauperism, orphanage, estates of the deceased, and the machinery of government itself. From this it appears that if all men were just, there still would be some, though not so much, need for government.