“The Court has not time to indulge in the discussion of imaginary cases.”

— Henry Bickersteth, 1st Baron Langdale

Sidebotham v. Barrington (1841), 3 Beav. 529.
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Henry Bickersteth, 1st Baron Langdale 13

British lawyer 1783–1851

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