The Architecture of Theories (1891)
“Primary causes are unknown to us; but are subject to simple and constant laws, which may be discovered by observation, the study of them being the object of natural philosophy.
Heat, like gravity, penetrates every substance of the universe, its rays occupy all parts of space. The object of our work is to set forth the mathematical laws which this element obeys. The theory of heat will hereafter form one of the most important branches of general physics.”
Source: The Analytical Theory of Heat (1878), Ch. 1, p. 1
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Joseph Fourier 4
French mathematician and physicist 1768–1830Related quotes
Robert Chambers, Chambers's Information for the People (1875) Vol. 2 https://books.google.com/books?id=vNpTAAAAYAAJ
This being the case, it is evident that the onus probandi [burden of proof] ought to lie with those who are willing to establish such an hypothesis, for it does not appear that Nature is in the habit of using one and the same mechanism with any two of our senses. Witness the vibration of air that makes sound, the effluvia that occasion smells, the particles that produce taste, the resistance or repulsive powers that affect the touch—all these are evidently suited to their respective organs of sense.
Source: Sir William Herschel: His Life and Works (1880), Ch.4 "Life and Works" on his discovery of the infrared.
Source: Sir William Herschel: His Life and Works (1880), Ch.4 "Life and Works" on his discovery of the infrared light.
Introduction, Lesson I: Definition and Sphere of the Science.
Elementary Lessons on Logic (1870)
1930s, Obituary for Emmy Noether (1935)
Source: A Manual of the Steam Engine and Other Prime Movers (1859), p. 31
“The general laws of Nature are not, for the most part, immediate objects of perception.”
Source: 1850s, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), p. 4; Ch. 1. Nature And Design Of This Work
Context: The general laws of Nature are not, for the most part, immediate objects of perception. They are either inductive inferences from a large body of facts, the common truth in which they express, or, in their origin at least, physical hypotheses of a causal nature serving to explain phenomena with undeviating precision, and to enable us to predict new combinations of them. They are in all cases, and in the strictest sense of the term, probable conclusions, approaching, indeed, ever and ever nearer to certainty, as they receive more and more of the confirmation of experience. But of the character of probability, in the strict and proper sense of that term, they are never wholly divested. On the other hand, the knowledge of the laws of the mind does not require as its basis any extensive collection of observations. The general truth is seen in the particular instance, and it is not confirmed by the repetition of instances.
p, 125
Reflections on the Motive Power of Heat (1824)
Reflections on the Motive Power of Heat (1824)