“To say the truth, whatever improvement private study may produce, there is still a peculiar advantage attendant on our appearance in the forum, where the light is different and there is an appearance of real responsibility quite different from the fictitious cases of the schools. If we estimate the two separately, practice without learning will be of more avail than learning without practice.”
Book XII, Chapter VI, 4; translation by Rev. John Selby Watson
De Institutione Oratoria (c. 95 AD)
Original
Et hercule quantumlibet secreta studia contulerint, est tamen proprius quidam fori profectus, alia lux, alia veri discriminis facies, plusque, si separes, usus sine doctrina quam citra usum doctrina valeat.
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Quintilian 18
ancient Roman rhetor 35–96Related quotes
Memories of Duckburg, http://www.helnwein.com/texte/helnweintexts/artikel_398.html, Zeit Magazin, Hamburg, 1989
Source: A Wild Sheep Chase: A Novel (1982), Chapter 17, The Strange Man's Strange Tale
“Man only is endowed with wisdom so as to understand religion, and this is the principal if not the only difference betwixt him and dumb animals; for other things that seem peculiar to him, though they are not the same in them, yet they appear to be alike … What is there more peculiar to man than reason, and foresight? Yet there are animals which make several different ways of retiring from their dens; that when in danger they may escape; which without understanding and forethought they could not do. Others make provision for the future.”
Solus (homo) sapientia instructus est ut religionem solus intellegat, et haec est hominis atque mutorum vel praecipua, vel sola distantia; nam caetera quae videntur hominis esse propria, etsi non sint talia in mutis, tamen similia videri possunt … Quid tam proprium homini quam ratio, et providentia futuri? Atqui sunt animalia, quae latibulis suis diversos, et plures exitus pandant; ut si quod periculum inciderit, fuga pateat obsessis; quod non facerent, nisi inesset illis intelligentia, et cogitatio. Alia provident in futurum.
De Ira Dei (c. 313), Chap. VII; as quoted in Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary (1697), London, 1737, Vol. 4, Chap. Rorarius, p. 903 https://books.google.it/books?id=JmtXAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA903.
Source: Part II : Practical Pictorial Photography, Fidelity to nature and justifiable untruth, p. 21
"On Revolutionary Morality" (1958)
1950's, On Revolutionary Morality (1958)
Source: https://twitter.com/canlubochris/status/1239546180633124864 | Christian Canlubo personal Twitter account
“We must learn to respect each other's views and to differ without anger or ill will.”
14 July 2005
Additional remarks about the proposed Reconciliation and Unity Commission
Source: A System of Logic (1843), p. 4
Context: [W]e may fancy that we see or feel what we in reality infer. Newton saw the truth of many propositions of geometry without reading the demonstrations, but not, we may be sure, without their flashing through his mind. A truth, or supposed truth, which is really the result of a very rapid inference, may seem to be apprehended intuitively. It has long been agreed by thinkers of the most opposite schools, that this mistake is actually made in so familiar an instance as that of the eyesight. There is nothing of which we appear to ourselves to be more directly conscious, than the distance of an object from us. Yet it has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the eye, is at most nothing more than a variously coloured surface; that when we fancy we see distance, all we really see is certain variations of apparent size, and degrees of faintness of colour; and that our estimate of the object's distance from us is the result of a comparison (made with so much rapidity that we are unconscious of making it) between the size and colour of the object as they appear at the time, and the size and colour of the same or of similar objects as they appeared when close at hand, or when their degree of remoteness was known by other evidence. The perception of distance by the eye, which seems so like intuition, is thus, in reality, an inference grounded on experience; an inference, too, which we learn to make; and which we make with more and more correctness as our experience increases; though in familiar cases it takes place, so rapidly as to appear exactly on a par with those perceptions of sight which are really intuitive, our perceptions of colour.