“I suspect that many of the world's financial lords are somewhat embarrassed to tell Japan repeatedly at G-7 meetings and elsewhere to adopt a Keynesian solution. Within Europe, central banks and governments think Keynesian theories and policies are absolutely wrong. Despite the remarkable success of pragmatic policies in the United States, true believers in the Invisible Hand reject Keynesian diagnoses and prescriptions. Many observers of Japan have found it intellectually comforting to blame the slump on the plight of the banks, flooded with bad loans dated from the land and equity bubbles and their collapse. They hope that a governmentmanaged and -subsidized rectification of bank balance sheets will trigger overall economic recovery. I think this is a false hope. The bank problem is only a small part of the macroeconomic disaster. It has to be resolved, of course, but resolution that is no substitute for the needed fiscal and monetary stimuli.”

— James Tobin

"Reflections on Japanese Political Economy" (1999)

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American economist 1918–2002

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“For policy, the central fact is that Keynesian policy recommendations have no sounder basis, in a scientific sense, than recommendations of non-Keynesian economists or, for that matter, non-economists.”

Thomas J. Sargent (1943) American economist

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Robert Lucas Jr. (1937) American economist

"After Keynesian macroeconomics" 1978

“For a period of roughly 35 years, Keynesian theory provided a central paradigm for macroeconomists, and considerable progress was made on several empirical fronts. It was widely recognized that some of the ingredients of Keynesian economics (e. g. money illusion and/or nominal wage rigidity) rested on slender to non-existent microtheoretic foundations; and there were always dissenters. But, thought of as a collection of empirical regularities that fit together into a coherent whole, the theory worked tolerably well. In the 1970s, however, the Keynesian paradigm was rejected by a great many academic economists, especially in the United States, in favour of what we now call new classical economics. By about 1980, it was hard to find an American academic macroeconomist under the age of 40 who professed to be a Keynesian. That was an astonishing intellectual turnabout in less than a decade, an intellectual revolution for sure.”

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“Lucas and Sargent’s main argument was that Keynesian economics had ignored the full implications of the effect of expectations on behavior. The way to proceed, they argued, was to assume that people formed expectations as rationally as they could, based on the information they had. Thinking of people as having rational expectations had three major implications, all highly damaging to Keynesian macroeconomics. …
The first implication was that existing macroeconomic models could not be used to help design policy. … The second implication was that when rational expectations were introduced in Keynesian models, these models actually delivered very un-Keynesian conclusions. … The third implication was that if people and firms had rational expectations, it was wrong to think of policy as the control of a complicated but passive system. Rather, the right way was to think of policy as a game between policy makers and the economy. …
To summarize: When rational expectations were introduced, Keynesian models could not be used to determine policy; Keynesian models could not explain long-lasting deviations of output from the natural level of output; the theory of policy had to be redesigned, using the tools of game theory.”

Olivier Blanchard (1948) French economist

Source: Macroeconomics (7th Edition, 2017), Ch. 24 : Epilogue: The Story of Macroeconomics

“Central banks have moved to stimulate spending in the face of this attempt to increase savings by lowering interest rates. They lowered them to the zero lower bound without having much effect; the fall in desired savings was too large. We are in a Keynesian liquidity trap. Central banks have tried to stimulate spending by actively increasing the money supply, raising fears of inflation in many circles. But no inflation has resulted as the cash sits idle in corporate coffers. Even at zero interest rates, business firms are reluctant to spend!
What to do? Many pundits say we must simply endure what they call secular stagnation. This is an unhappy prediction. Much better is the Keynesian insight that this is the perfect time for fiscal policy. In the U. S. again, there are immediate needs to repair roads and bridges, rebuild the energy grid, and modernize other means of travel. Keynesian fiscal policy expansion will benefit the economy in both the short and long run.”

Peter Temin (1937) American economist

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“It would appear that the Keynesian faithful have foisted on free-market capitalists an unfalsifiable theory. Evidence that contradicts it, Keynesian kooks enlist as evidence for the correctness of their theory.”

Ilana Mercer South African writer

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2010s, 2013

“[Keynesian]I am now a Keynesian in economics.”

Richard Nixon (1913–1994) 37th President of the United States of America

Just after a broadcast interview with four newsmen (6 January 1971), according to Howard K. Smith, one of the interviewers. "Nixon Has Shifted to Ideas of Keyness: ABC Commentator" http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=awpdAAAAIBAJ&pg=916,487551
1970s

“The Keynesian Revolution was, in the form in which it succeeded in the United States, a revolution in method.”

Robert Lucas Jr. (1937) American economist

This was not Keynes’s intent, nor is it the view of all of his most eminent followers. Yet if one does not view the revolution in this way, it is impossible to account for some of its most important features.
"After Keynesian macroeconomics" 1978

“The central message is still that, as Keynes argued, fiscal policy is the answer to liquidity traps, financial or political. The arguments against fiscal policy in Japan, so far as I understand them are intellectually fallacious; they would receive failing grades in an undergraduate macro exam.”

James Tobin (1918–2002) American economist

"Reflections on Japanese Political Economy" (1999)

“The Second World War supplied the occasion for the spending, and Keynesian economics supplied the rationale. But Keynesian fiscal policy had political appeal even before the war demonstrated its economic success. For unlike the various proposals for structural reform, such as vigorous antitrust action or national economic planning, Keynesian economics offered a way for the government to control the economy without having to choose among controversial views of the good society. Where earlier reformers had sought economic arrangements that would cultivate, citizens of a certain kind, Keynesians undertook no formative mission; they proposed simply to accept existing consumer preferences and to regulate the economy by manipulating aggregate demand.”

Michael J. Sandel (1953) American political philosopher

1. America's Search for a Public Philosophy
Public Philosophy (2005)

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