“It is now known that the truth or falsity of the continuum hypothesis and other related conjectures cannot be determined by set theory as we know it today. This state of affairs regarding a classical and presumably well-posed problem must certainly appear rather unsatisfactory to the average mathematician. One is tempted to look more closely and perhaps more critically at the foundations of mathematics. Although our present "Cantorian" mathematics is highly successful in its treatment of abstractions, one must not overlook the fact that from the very beginning the use of infinite processes was regarded with suspicion by many people.”

—  Paul Cohen

Set theory and the continuum hypothesis, p. 1. https://books.google.com/books?id=Z4NCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 Courier Corporation, 2008 (Dover reprint).
Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis (1966)

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American mathematician 1934–2007

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