“The players in a game are said to be in strategic equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) when their play is mutually optimal: when the actions and plans of each player are rational in the given strategic environment – i. e., when each knows the actions and plans of the others.”

—  Robert Aumann

Source: War and peace (2005), p. 4

Adopted from Wikiquote. Last update June 3, 2021. History

Help us to complete the source, original and additional information

Do you have more details about the quote "The players in a game are said to be in strategic equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) when their play is mutually optim…" by Robert Aumann?
Robert Aumann photo
Robert Aumann 16
Israeli-American mathematician 1930

Related quotes

“Game theory is a theory of strategic interaction. That is to say, it is a theory of rational behavior in social situations in which each player has to choose his moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players’ countermoves are likely to be.”

John Harsanyi (1920–2000) hungarian economist

Source: "Games with Incomplete Information," 1997, p. 136

Robert Aumann photo

“Repetition acts as an enforcement mechanism: It makes cooperation achievable when it is not achievable in the one-shot game, even when one replaces strategic equilibrium as the criterion for achievability by the more stringent requirement of perfect equilibrium.”

Robert Aumann (1930) Israeli-American mathematician

Source: War and peace (2005), p. 7

Eric Maskin photo

“That strategic rivalry in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. Repeated play allows players to respond to each other’s actions, and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. The fear of retaliation may thus lead to outcomes that otherwise would not occur. The most dramatic expression of this phenomenon is the celebrated "Folk Theorem." An outcome that Pareto dominates the minimax point is called individually rational. The Folk Theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting.”

Eric Maskin (1950) American Nobel laureate in economics

and Eric Maskin. " The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/cs286r/spring06/papers/fudmaskin_folk86.pdf." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1986): p. 533; Lead paragraph.

Henry Mintzberg photo

“Strategic planning is not strategic thinking. Indeed, strategic planning often spoils strategic thinking, causing managers to confuse real vision with the manipulation of numbers.”

Henry Mintzberg (1939) Canadian busines theorist

Attributed to Mintzberg in C.W. Cook, P.L. Hunsaker (2001) Management and organizational behavior. p. 58

“The thinking that underpins strategic planning is a legacy of more stable times when the environment was changing sufficiently slowly for an effective corporate response to emerge from methodical organisational routines.”

Max Boisot (1943–2011) British academic and educator

Source: Information Space, 1995, p. 33

Garry Kasparov photo

“This obligation to move can be a burden to a player without strategic vision.”

Garry Kasparov (1963) former chess world champion

Part I, Chapter 3, Strategy And Tactics At Work, p. 36
2000s, How Life Imitates Chess (2007)

Pelé photo

“When you play against dirty players or very tough players, it’s easy to escape because you know what they’re going to do. But when the player is tough but intelligent, it’s much more difficult.”

Pelé (1940–2022) Brazilian association football player
Tawakkol Karman photo

“Women have become at the forefront of these demonstrations and lines in protests — in the medical camps, in the security services, in the strategic planning for the revolution and the strategic planning for the civil democratic society after the revolution.”

Tawakkol Karman (1979) Yemeni journalist, politician, human rights activist, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient

2010s, Nobel Prize winner highlights women’s role in Arab Spring (2011)

“We can regard the vector ci as representing certain physical, social, and psychological attributes of player i himself in that it summarizes some crucial parameters of player i's own payoff function Ui as well as the main parameters of his beliefs about his social and physical environment… the rules of the game as such allow any given player i to belong to any one of a number of possible types, corresponding to the alternative values of his attribute vector c i could take… Each player is assumed to know his own actual type but to be in general ignorant about the other players' actual types.”

John Harsanyi (1920–2000) hungarian economist

Source: "Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players," 1967, p. 171; As quoted in: Mertens, Jean-Francois, and Shmuel Zamir. " Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information http://jeremy-chen.org/sites/default/files/files/convexset/2013_01/formulation_of_bayesian_analysis_for_games_with_incomplete_information_mertens_and_zamir_1985.pdf." International Journal of Game Theory 14.1 (1985): p. 1-2

“When I was a kid I wanted to become a manga creator, but over time I realized video games are special due to how the player has direct control of the action. So, that became very appealing.”

Kenichiro Takaki (1976) Japanese video game producer

"Interview: Senran Kagura Producer Kenichiro Takaki Talks Sexuality, Violence in Games, and Peach Beach Splash" https://www.playstationlifestyle.net/2017/07/13/senran-kagura-interview-peach-beach-splash-kenichiro-takaki/, PlayStationLifeStyle.net (13 July 2017).

Related topics