“Kuhn as does Popper rejects the idea that science grows by accumulation of eternal truths.. But while according to Popper science is ‘revolution in permanence’, and criticism the heart of the scientific enterprise, according to Kuhn revolution is exceptional and, indeed, extra-scientific, and criticism is, in ‘normal’ times, anathema… The clash between Popper and Kuhn is not about a mere technical point in epistemology. It concerns our central intellectual values, and has implications not only for theoretical physics but also for the underdeveloped social sciences and even for moral and political philosophy. If even in science there is no other way of judging a theory but by assessing the number, faith and vocal energy of its supporters, then this must be even more so in the social sciences: truth lies in power. Thus Kuhn’s position would vindicate, no doubt, unintentionally, the basic political credo of contemporary religious maniacs”

—  Imre Lakatos

‘student revolutionaries’ <br class="br">Imre Lakatos (1974) &quot; From Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge http://www.inf.fu-berlin.de/lehre/pmo/eng/Lakatos-Falsification.pdf&quot;. as cited in: Thora Margareta Bertilsson (2009) Peirce&#x27;s Theory of Inquiry and Beyond. p. 41.

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Imre Lakatos6
Hungarian mathematician, philosopher 1921–1974

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