“One of the most intriguing discoveries of experimental economics is that (1) as we have seen, people invariably behave non-cooperatively in small and large group ‘impersonal’ market exchange institutions; (2) many (up to half in single play; over 90% in repeat play) cooperate in ‘personal’ exchange (two-person extensive form games); (3) yet in both economic environments all interactions are between anonymous players.”

—  Vernon L. Smith

Source: "Constructivist and ecological rationality in economics," 2002, p. 528.

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Vernon L. Smith20
American economist 1927

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