“With regard to the construction of statutes according to the intention of the legislature, we must remember that there is an essential difference between the expounding of modern and ancient Acts of Parliament. In early times the legislature used (and I believe it was a wise course to take) to pass laws in general and in few terms; they were left to the Courts of law to be construed so as to reach all the cases within the mischief to be remedied. But in modern times great care has been taken to mention the particular cases in the contemplation of the legislature, and therefore the Courts are not permitted to take the same liberty in construing them as they did in expounding the ancient statutes.”

— Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon

Bradley and another v. Clark (1793), 5 T. R. 201.

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Lloyd Kenyon, 1st Baron Kenyon 92

British Baron 1732–1802

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