Robert Axelrod citations

Robert Axelrod est professeur de science politique, lauréat du prix MacArthur en 1987. Ses travaux sur l'évolution de la coopération, liée à la théorie des jeux, ont été cités dans plus de cinq mille articles scientifiques. Il est président de l’American Political Science Association pour l'année 2006-2007.

La théorie de Robert Axelrod, fondée sur des interprétations de la théorie des jeux à somme non nulle , est utilisée par Richard Dawkins dans son ouvrage "Le gène égoïste" pour expliquer la nécessaire coopération des gènes dans l'individu. Le donnant-donnant trouve une confirmation dans la théorie de l'évolution . Ses travaux ont aussi été utilisés par le philosophe Peter Singer dans son ouvrage Une gauche darwinienne. Wikipedia  

✵ 27. mai 1943
Robert Axelrod: 15   citations 0   J'aime

Robert Axelrod: Citations en anglais

“The theory of evolution is based on the struggle for life and the survival of the fittest. Yet cooperation is common between members of the same species and even between members of different species.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Axelrod, Robert, and William Donald Hamilton. "The evolution of cooperation." Science 211.4489 (1981): 1390

“In complex environments, individuals are not fully able to analyze the situation and calculate their optimal strategy. Instead they can be expected to adapt their strategy over time based upon what has been effective and what has not.”

Robert Axelrod livre The Complexity of Cooperation

Chap. 1 : Evolving New Strategies

Adapted from Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, ed. Lawrence Davis (London: Pitman; Los Altos, Calif.: Morgan Kaufman, 1987)
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)

“Just as important as getting cooperation started were the conditions that allowed it to be sustainable. The strategies that could sustain mutual cooperation were the ones which were provocable.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 4 : The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Change the payoffs.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

A common reaction of someone caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma is that "there ought to be a law against this sort of thing."

In fact, getting out of Prisoner's Dilemmas is one of the primary functions of government: to make sure that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway. Laws are passed to cause people to pay their taxes, not to steal, and to honor contracts with strangers. Each of these activities could be regarded as a giant Prisoner's Dilemma game with many players.

Chap. 7 : How to Promote Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If a nice strategy cannot be invaded by a single individual, it cannot be invaded by any cluster of individuals either.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 7.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“The strategies which can invade ALL D in a cluster with the smallest value of p are those which are maximally discriminating, such as TIT FOR TAT.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 6.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“ALL D is always collectively stable.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 5.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“For a nice strategy to be collectively stable, it must be provoked by the very first defection of the other player.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“Any strategy which may be the first to cooperate can be collectively stable only when w is sufficiently large.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 3.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“TIT FOR TAT is collectively stable if and only if, w is large enough. This critical value of w is a function of the four payoff parameters, T; R, P, and S.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 2.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

“If the discount parameter, w, is sufficiently high, there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player.”

Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation

Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

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