Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Axelrod, Robert, and William Donald Hamilton. "The evolution of cooperation." Science 211.4489 (1981): 1390
Robert Axelrod est professeur de science politique, lauréat du prix MacArthur en 1987. Ses travaux sur l'évolution de la coopération, liée à la théorie des jeux, ont été cités dans plus de cinq mille articles scientifiques. Il est président de l’American Political Science Association pour l'année 2006-2007.
La théorie de Robert Axelrod, fondée sur des interprétations de la théorie des jeux à somme non nulle , est utilisée par Richard Dawkins dans son ouvrage "Le gène égoïste" pour expliquer la nécessaire coopération des gènes dans l'individu. Le donnant-donnant trouve une confirmation dans la théorie de l'évolution . Ses travaux ont aussi été utilisés par le philosophe Peter Singer dans son ouvrage Une gauche darwinienne. Wikipedia
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Axelrod, Robert, and William Donald Hamilton. "The evolution of cooperation." Science 211.4489 (1981): 1390
Robert Axelrod livre The Complexity of Cooperation
Chap. 4 : Choosing Sides
Adapted from Robert Axelrod and D. Scott Bennett “A Landscape Theory of Aggregation,” British Journal of Political Science 23 (Apr. 1993): 211–33.
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)
Robert Axelrod livre The Complexity of Cooperation
Chap. 1 : Evolving New Strategies
Adapted from Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Strategies in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in Genetic Algorithms and Simulated Annealing, ed. Lawrence Davis (London: Pitman; Los Altos, Calif.: Morgan Kaufman, 1987)
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)
Robert Axelrod livre The Complexity of Cooperation
Introduction
The Complexity of Cooperation (1997)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 6 : How to Choose Effectively
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 4 : The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
A common reaction of someone caught in a Prisoner's Dilemma is that "there ought to be a law against this sort of thing."
In fact, getting out of Prisoner's Dilemmas is one of the primary functions of government: to make sure that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway. Laws are passed to cause people to pay their taxes, not to steal, and to honor contracts with strangers. Each of these activities could be regarded as a giant Prisoner's Dilemma game with many players.
Chap. 7 : How to Promote Cooperation
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 4 : The Live-and-Let-Live System in World War I
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 7.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 6.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
“ALL D is always collectively stable.”
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 5.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 3.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 2.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)
Robert Axelrod The evolution of cooperation
Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)