Neil Fligstein: Firm

Neil Fligstein is American sociologist. Explore interesting quotes on firm.
Neil Fligstein: 80   quotes 0   likes

“The experiences of the war changed both Baruch’s and Wilson’s attitude toward the large firm. Following the war their anti-firm rhetoric was replaced with praise for the large firm’s patriotism and contribution to progress.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 112

War , Change

“Organizational theory is one of the most vibrant areas in sociological research. Scholars from many subfields, (medical sociology, political sociology, social movements, education) have felt compelled to study organizational theory because of the obviously important role that complex organizations play in their empirical research. But scholars who do not do organizational theory are often struck at how arcane the debates are within organizational theory. They also think most of organizational theory is about firms and thus, the theory does not seem to have much application to other kinds of social arenas.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: Organizations: Theoretical Debates and the Scope of Organizational Theory, 2001, p. 1

Education , Thinking , Study

“The social structures of markets and the internal organisation of firms are best viewed as attempts to mitigate the effects of competition with other firms.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions, 1996, p. 657

“All large organizations have an internal power struggle over the goals and resources of the organization…. In the largest firms, there are two bases of control : formal ownership and authority. Those who own the firm control by virtue of ownership. Authority relations embedded in the organizational structure legitimate how managers can control organizations.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 10 ; As cited in: François L'Italien, BÉHÉMOTH CAPITAL. Contribution à une théorie dialectique de la financiarisation de la grande corporation. Université Laval, 2012. p. 147 (Many of the following quotes came from this source)

“Organizational and not financial or ownership embeddedness is likely to be a more important cause of actions of firms than anything else in the case of United States. This means efforts should concentrate on specifying models of relations between firms that focus on intra- and interorganizational processes, such as the construction of strategic action and the cultural frames by which such a construction makes sense.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The architecture of markets, 2001, p. 145

Sense , Effort

“The finance conception of the modern corporation, which currently dominates, emphasizes control through the use of financial tools which measure performance according to profit rates. Product lines are evaluated on their short-run profitability and important management decisions are based on the potential profitability of each line. Firms are viewed as collections of assets earning differing rates of return, not as producers of given goods. The firm is not seen as being a member of only one industry. Consequently if the prospect of an industry in which it participates declines, the firm disinvests. The problem for management from this perspective is to maximize short-run rates of return by altering product mix, thereby increasing shareholder equity and keeping the stock price high”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 15

Problem , Decision

“I use the metaphor "markets as politics" to create a sociological view of action in markets. I develop a conceptual view of the social institutions that comprise markets, discuss a sociological model of action in which market participants try to create stable worlds and find social solutions to competition, and discuss how markets and states are intimately linked. From these foundations, I generate propositions about how politics in markets work during various stages of market development-- formation, stability, and transformation. At the formation of markets, when actors in firms are trying to create a status hierarchy that enforces noncompetitive forms of competition, political action resembles social movements. In stable markets, incumbent firms defend their positions against challengers and invaders. During periods of market transformation, invaders can reintroduce more fluid social-movement-like conditions.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions, 1996, p. 656; Abstract

World

“The firm-as-portfolio model implies both a practice (growth through diversification) and a form (the conglomerate). Unrelated diversification entails buying businesses in industries that are neither potential buyers, suppliers, competitors, or complements to the firm’s current business.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 229

Business

“The basic insight of the finance conception was that such a firm could be more tightly controlled by strict accounting. This progression does not imply, however, that one conception of control caused the emergence of its successor. New conceptions of control evolved out of key interactions among firms and between firms and the state.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 16

“Younger and smaller firms would be more likely to adopt the MDF (Multidivisional Form) than older and larger ones.”

Neil Fligstein

Fligstein, Neil. "The spread of the multidivisional form among large firms, 1919-1979." Advances in Strategic Management 17 (1985): 55-78.

“The power struggle within the firm determines which conception of control will dominate and how that conception will be translated into concrete strategies. The winners of this struggle will push the organization into a certain direction and maintain that direction as long as their strategies bring positive results.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 17

“The organizational fields of the largest firms continued to be unstable. There were no accepted rules to define how firms could avoid destructive competition, so they attempted to control their markets through various aggressive trade tactics, continued mergers, cartels, getting the federal government to guarantee profitability.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 89

“I claim that the central goal of managers in the past hundred years has been to make sure their firms survived. To promote survival they proposed various forms of control, both inside and outside the firm. Internally, control was oriented to ensuring that organizational resources were deployed so that top management could be confident that their directives were being executed. Externally, this control was oriented toward establishing stable relations between competitors to promote the survival of their organizations.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 5

Confidence , Past

“The leaders of the large firms dominated by the manufacturing conception saw the key problem as low prices. This meant that they were intent on controlling prices by cutting production. But once prices were stabilized, they were cautious about increasing production for fear that prices would again collapse. Since their competitors had roughly equal production capacities and costs, all would lose by too rapid an increase in production.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 117

Fear , Problem

“Once in place as control perspectives, they are widely shared ways of reducing complexity of the world. They come into the existence in a piecemeal fashion and are articulated by representatives of the largest, most successful firms. They are propagated by the business press and informal links between organizations and then are supported by those organizations and organizational fields.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 12

World , Way , Fashion , Business

“Property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange are arenas in which modern states establish rules for economic actors. States provide stable and reliable conditions under which firms organize, compete, cooperate and exchange. The enforcement of the laws affects what conceptions of control can produce stable markets. There are political contests over the content of laws, their applicability to given firms and markets, and the extent and direction of state intervention into economy. Such laws are never neutral. They favor certain groups of firms.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: Markets as politics: A political-cultural approach to market institutions, 1996, p. 657

Law

“The key argument is that managers and owners in firms search for stable patterns of interaction with their largest competitors. Once stable patterns prove to be both legal and profitable, firms set up organizational fields that tend to produce and reproduce those patterns.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The architecture of markets, 2001, p. 155

Search

“The main problem actors face is uncertainty caused by difficulties in finding suppliers and customers and in controlling their own firm.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The architecture of markets, 2001, p. 16

Problem

“The purpose of the large horizontal (same-product) mergers was to reduce the number of plants and, hence, control production enough to insure a reasonable rate of profit. Mergers would allow a newly created large firm to produce full-time in its most efficient plants, and thereby maintain prices, production, and profits.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 55

Time

“A leading firm that controlled a large portion of the output of a given organizational field operated as a price setter. To set prices, the actors in that firm had to control their suppliers and marketing in order to increase their own efficiency and have the potential to cut off other firms from supplies or customers.”

Neil Fligstein

Source: The transformation of corporate control, 1993, p. 89