Arithmetica Universalis is a mathematics text by Isaac Newton. Written in Latin, it was edited and published by William Whiston, Newton's successor as Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the University of Cambridge. The Arithmetica was based on Newton's lecture notes.
Though many prefer the Parabola before it, for the Simplicity of the Æquation by which it is express'd. But by this Reason the Parabola ought to be preferr'd before the Circle it self, which it never is. Therefore the reasoning from the Simplicity of the Æquation will not hold. The modern Geometers are too fond of the Speculation of Æquations.
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
p, 125
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
p, 125
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
p, 125
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Arithmetica Universalis (1707), p.251
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: Whereas in Arithmetick Questions are only resolv'd by proceeding from given Quantities to the Quantities sought, Algebra proceeds in a retrograde Order, from the Quantities sought as if they were given, to the Quantities given as if they were sought, to the End that we may some Way or other come to a Conclusion or Æquation, from which one may bring out the Quantity sought. And after this Way the most difficult problems are resolv'd, the Resolutions whereof would be sought in vain from only common Arithmetick. Yet Arithmetick in all its Operations is so subservient to Algebra, as that they seem both but to make one perfect Science of Computing; and therefore I will explain them both together.<!--pp.1-2
Arithmetica Universalis (1707), p.232
“Useful Things, though Mechanical, are justly preferable to useless Speculations in Geometry”
Arithmetica Universalis (1707), p.248
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: Geometry was invented that we might expeditiously avoid, by drawing Lines, the Tediousness of Computation. Therefore these two Sciences ought not to be confounded. The Antients did so industriously distinguish them from one another, that they never introduc'd Arithmetical Terms into Geometry. And the Moderns, by confounding both, have lost the Simplicity in which all the Elegancy of Geometry consists. Wherefore that is Arithmetically more simple which is determin'd by the more simple Æquations, but that is Geometrically more simple which is determin'd by the more simple drawing of Lines; and in Geometry, that ought to be reckon'd best which is Geometrically most simple. Wherefore, I ought not to be blamed, if with that Prince of Mathematicians, Archimedes and other Antients, I make use of the Conchoid for the Construction of solid Problems.<!--p.230
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: In Constructions that are equally Geometrical, the most simple are always to be preferr'd. This Law is so universal as to be without Exception. But Algebraick Expressions add nothing to the Simplicity of the Construction; the bare Descriptions of the Lines only are here to be consider'd and these alone were consider'd by those Geometricians who joyn'd a Circle with a right Line. And as these are easy or hard, the Construction becomes easy or hard: And therefore it is foreign to the Nature of the Thing, from any Thing else to establish Laws about Constructions. Either therefore let us, with the Antients, exclude all Lines besides the Circle, and perhaps the Conick Sections, out of Geometry, or admit all, according to the Simplicity of the Description. If the Trochoid were admitted into Geometry, we might, by its Means, divide an Angle in any given Ratio. Would you therefore blame those who should make Use of this Line... and contend that this Line was not defin'd by an Æquition, but that you must make use of such Lines as are defin'd by Æquations? <!--pp.228-229
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: The Antients, as we learn from Pappus, in vain endeavour'd at the Trisection of an Angle, and the finding out of two mean Proportionals by a right line and a Circle. Afterwards they began to consider the Properties of several other Lines. as the Conchoid, the Cissoid, and the Conick Sections, and by some of these to solve these Problems. At length, having more throughly examin'd the Matter, and the Conick Sections being receiv'd into Geometry, they distinguish'd Problems into three Kinds: viz. (1.) Into Plane ones, which deriving their Original from Lines on a Plane, may be solv'd by a right Line and a Circle; (2.) Into Solid ones, which were solved by Lines deriving their Original from the Consideration of a Solid, that is, of a Cone; (3.) And Linear ones, to the Solution of which were requir'd Lines more compounded. And according to this Distinction, we are not to solve solid Problems by other Lines than the Conick Sections; especially if no other Lines but right ones, a Circle, and the Conick Sections, must be receiv'd into Geometry. But the Moderns advancing yet much farther, have receiv'd into Geometry all Lines that can be express'd by Æquations, and have distinguish'd, according to the Dimensions of the Æquations, those Lines into Kinds; and have made it a Law, that you are not to construct a Problem by a Line of a superior Kind, that may be constructed by one of an inferior one. In the Contemplation of Lines, and finding out their Properties, I like their Distinction of them into Kinds, according to the Dimensions thy Æquations by which they are defin'd. But it is not the Æquation, but the Description that makes the Curve to be a Geometrical one.<!--pp.227-228
“But it is not the Æquation, but the Description that makes the Curve to be a Geometrical one.”
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: The Antients, as we learn from Pappus, in vain endeavour'd at the Trisection of an Angle, and the finding out of two mean Proportionals by a right line and a Circle. Afterwards they began to consider the Properties of several other Lines. as the Conchoid, the Cissoid, and the Conick Sections, and by some of these to solve these Problems. At length, having more throughly examin'd the Matter, and the Conick Sections being receiv'd into Geometry, they distinguish'd Problems into three Kinds: viz. (1.) Into Plane ones, which deriving their Original from Lines on a Plane, may be solv'd by a right Line and a Circle; (2.) Into Solid ones, which were solved by Lines deriving their Original from the Consideration of a Solid, that is, of a Cone; (3.) And Linear ones, to the Solution of which were requir'd Lines more compounded. And according to this Distinction, we are not to solve solid Problems by other Lines than the Conick Sections; especially if no other Lines but right ones, a Circle, and the Conick Sections, must be receiv'd into Geometry. But the Moderns advancing yet much farther, have receiv'd into Geometry all Lines that can be express'd by Æquations, and have distinguish'd, according to the Dimensions of the Æquations, those Lines into Kinds; and have made it a Law, that you are not to construct a Problem by a Line of a superior Kind, that may be constructed by one of an inferior one. In the Contemplation of Lines, and finding out their Properties, I like their Distinction of them into Kinds, according to the Dimensions thy Æquations by which they are defin'd. But it is not the Æquation, but the Description that makes the Curve to be a Geometrical one.<!--pp.227-228
Arithmetica Universalis (1707)
Context: The Circle is a Geometrical Line, not because it may be express'd by an Æquation, but because its Description is a Postulate. It is not the Simplicity of the Æquation, but the Easiness of the Description, which is to determine the Choice of our Lines for the Construction of Problems. For the Æquation that expresses a Parabola, is more simple than That that expresses a Circle, and yet the Circle, by reason of its more simple Construction, is admitted before it. The Circle and the Conick Sections, if you regard the Dimension of the Æquations, are of the fame Order, and yet the Circle is not number'd with them in the Construction of Problems, but by reason of its simple Description, is depressed to a lower Order, viz. that of a right Line; so that it is not improper to express that by a Circle that may be expressed by a right Line. But it is a Fault to construct that by the Conick Sections which may be constructed by a Circle. Either therefore you must take your Law and Rule from the Dimensions of Æquations as observ'd in a Circle, and so take away the Distinction between Plane and Solid Problems; or else you must grant, that that Law is not so strictly to be observ'd in Lines of superior Kinds, but that some, by reason of their more simple Description, may be preferr'd to others of the same Order, and may be number'd with Lines of inferior Orders in the Construction of Problems.<!--p.228
