John R. Commons (1862–1945) United States institutional economist and labor historian
Source: Legal foundations of capitalism. 1924, p. 351-352
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)
Judicial opinions
John R. Commons (1862–1945) United States institutional economist and labor historian
Source: Legal foundations of capitalism. 1924, p. 351-352
“It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.”
Robert H. Jackson (1892–1954) American judge
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 131, 131 (1943)
Judicial opinions
Clarence Thomas (1948) Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Obergefell v. Hodges http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf (26 June 2015). <br class="br">2010s
Clarence Thomas (1948) Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
Obergefell v. Hodges http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf (26 June 2015). <br class="br">2010s
“Due process is a growth too sturdy to succumb to the infection of the least ingredient of error.”
Benjamin N. Cardozo (1870–1938) United States federal judge
Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264, 278 (1935)
Judicial opinions
“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my opinion, on its own bottom.”
John Marshall Harlan II (1899–1971) American judge and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (1899-1971)
Concurring in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Mohamed Nasheed (1967) Maldivian politician, 4th president of the Maldives
John Kerry on President Mohamed Nasheed imprisoned for ordering an arrest of a judge while in office, quoted on HaveeruOnline, "Maldives hails India, Pakistan for saving from Commonwealth body agenda" http://www.haveeru.com.mv/news/66969, March 1, 2016. <br class="br">About
Robert H. Jackson (1892–1954) American judge
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224–25 (1953)
Judicial opinions
Context: Procedural fairness, if not all that originally was meant by due process of law, is at least what it most uncompromisingly requires. Procedural due process is more elemental and less flexible than substantive due process. It yields less to the times, varies less with conditions, and defers much less to legislative judgment. Insofar as it is technical law, it must be a specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary on which they do not bend before political branches of the Government, as they should on matters of policy which compromise substantive law.
If it be conceded that in some way [that the agency could take the action it did], does it matter what the procedure is? Only the untaught layman or the charlatan lawyer can answer that procedure matters not. Procedural fairness and regularity are of the indispensable essence of liberty. Severe substantive laws can be endured if they are fairly and impartially applied. Indeed, if put to the choice, one might well prefer to live under Soviet substantive law applied in good faith by our common-law procedures than under our substantive law enforced by Soviet procedural practices. Let it not be overlooked that due process of law is not for the sole benefit of an accused. It is the best insurance for the Government itself against those blunders which leave lasting stains on a system of justice but which are bound to occur on ex parte consideration.
Ernst Mach (1838–1916) Austrian physicist and university educator
3rd edition, p. 318ff, As quoted by Phillip Frank, Philosophy of Science: The Link Between Science and Philosophy (1957)
20th century, "Erkenntnis und Irrtum: Skizzen zur Psychologie der Forschung" (1905)