Source: "Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players," 1967, p. 159 : Abstract
“Note the situation is different when the player is permitted to vary his stakes. In this case there exist advantageous strategies, and the game depends on the strategy.”
Source: An Introduction To Probability Theory And Its Applications (Third Edition), Chapter VIII, Unlimited Sequences Of Bernoulli Trials, p. 200
Help us to complete the source, original and additional information
William Feller 30
Croatian-American mathematician 1906–1970Related quotes
Chap. 1 : The Problem of Cooperation
Proposition 1.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

Les discours sont des éléments ou des blocs tactiques dans le champ des rapports de force; il peut y en avoir de différents et même de contradictoires à l'intérieur d'une même stratégie; ils peuvent au contraire circuler sans changer de forme entre des stratégies opposées.
Vol I, pp. 101-102
History of Sexuality (1976–1984)
Larry Samuelson. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection. 1997. Overview.
"Interview with W.Chan Kim & Renée Mauborgne," in: Blue Ocean Strategy http://centres.insead.edu/blue-ocean-strategy/documents/e-ibosi2015.pdf, INSEAD document, 2015.
Source: 1960s, "The Use and Misuse of Game Theory," 1962, p. 110
Source: "Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players," 1967, p. 163: Lead paragraph's
Source: Conversation, Cognition and Learning (1975), p. 261 as cited in: K.V. Wilson (2011) From Associations to Structure. p. 200.
Chap. 3 : The Chronology of Cooperation
Proposition 4.
The Evolution of Cooperation (1984; 2006)

Source: "Diversity and Profitability", 1982, p. 359; Abstract