“That subtle knot which makes us man:
So must pure lovers' souls descend
T' affections, and to faculties,
Which sense may reach and apprehend,
Else a great Prince in prison lies.”

— John Donne

The Extasy, line 64

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John Donne 115

English poet 1572–1631

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