“That strategic rivalry in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. Repeated play allows players to respond to each other’s actions, and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. The fear of retaliation may thus lead to outcomes that otherwise would not occur. The most dramatic expression of this phenomenon is the celebrated "Folk Theorem." An outcome that Pareto dominates the minimax point is called individually rational. The Folk Theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting.”
and Eric Maskin. " The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/~parkes/cs286r/spring06/papers/fudmaskin_folk86.pdf." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1986): p. 533; Lead paragraph.
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Eric Maskin 5
American Nobel laureate in economics 1950Related quotes
Source: 1960s, Fights, games, and debates, (1960), p. 10

" Nobel Prize 2005 Press Release http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2005/press.html" 10 October 2005
Source: "Games with Incomplete Information," 1997, p. 136
Anatol Rapoport. (1974). Game Theory as a Theory of Conflict Resolution p. 4
1970s and later
Source: Quote, The Concept of Strategy, 1971, p. 38, cited in: Gastón de los Reyes, Jr. "Introduction (as presented) to The Concept of Strategy 40 Years Later." August 15, 2011, at lgst.wharton.upenn.edu.
“It must be understood that a fair game may be distinctly unfavorable to the player.”
Source: An Introduction To Probability Theory And Its Applications (Third Edition), Chapter X, Law Of large Numbers, p. 249.
Context: Much harm was done by the misleading suggestive power of this name. It must be understood that a fair game may be distinctly unfavorable to the player.