
Divine Action: An Interview with John Polkinghorne http://www.aril.org/polkinghorne.htm by Lyndon F. Harris in Cross Currents, Spring 1998, Vol. 48 Issue 1.
Introduction
Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991)
Divine Action: An Interview with John Polkinghorne http://www.aril.org/polkinghorne.htm by Lyndon F. Harris in Cross Currents, Spring 1998, Vol. 48 Issue 1.
Introduction
Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991)
Alan Hovhaness, Interview with Ararat Magazine http://www.hovhaness.com/Interview_Ararat.html, 1971.
1920s, The Genius of America (1924)
on sexism and racism, in * 1990-05-03
Harvard Student Tackles Racism At Core
Illinois Daily Herald
Allison J.
Pugh
Section 3, Page 2
quoted in * 2012-03-14
Obama 1990 Interview: ‘We’re Going To Reshape Mean Spirited Selfish America, I Hope To Be Part Of Transformation’
velvethammer
Ironic Surrealism
http://ironicsurrealism.com/2012/03/14/obama-1990-interview-were-going-to-reshape-mean-spirited-america
2012-03-20; and * 2012-03-18
Rachel Maddow Asks Why Both Presidents George Bush ‘Hate America’ Like Barack Obama
Tommy
Christopher
Mediaite
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/rachel-maddow-asks-why-both-presidents-george-bush-hate-america-like-barack-obama/
2012-03-20
1990s
On his election to be the first black president of the Harvard Law Review, as quoted in "No Cushy Post for this Pioneer Harvard Law Review Chief Plans to Work in Inner City", by Allison J Pugh in The Akron Beacon-Journal (19 April 1990)
1990s
Alex Jones in the 2009 interview https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jpscVMiuTVY with Icke (starts at 1:00)
About Icke
“Relativism and the Use of Language,” pp. 124-126.
Language is Sermonic (1970)
Context: One type of critic today tends to attack language as a means of communication on this very ground — the ground that words are conventional in their meaning and are therefore falsifying. The point of the criticism is that a convention is something abstracted and, therefore, untrue, a generalized sign of the thing itself, which we use because we are unable or unwilling to render the thing in itself in its fullness. A word in this conception is nothing but a stereotype, and “stereotype” is here an expression of disparagement, because it is felt that “typing” anything that is real distorts the thing by presenting it in something less than its full individuality and concreteness. Let us suppose that I make reference to a tree standing in my yard. The term “tree” does not designate the object with any degree of particularity. It does not tell whether the tree is young or old, low or tall, an oak, pine, or maple. The term is, therefore, merely a utility symbol, which I employ in communicating because in my laziness or incompetence I cannot find a fuller and more individualizing way of expressing this tree. If I were really communicating, the argument goes, I would reject the falsifying stereotype and produce something more nearly like the picture of the tree. But if the analysis I have offered earlier is correct, these critics are beginning at the wrong end. They are assuming that individual real objects are carriers of meaning, that the meaning is found in them as redness is found in an apple, and that it ought to be expressed with the main object of fidelity to the particular. What they overlook is that meaning does not exist in this sense, that it is something that we create for purposes of cognition and communication, and that the ideal construct has the virtue of its ideality. Hence it appears that they misconceive the function of the word as conventional sign or “typifier.” For if it is true that the word conveys something less than the fullness of the thing signified, it is also true that it conveys something more. A word in this role is a generalization. the value of a generalization is that while it leaves out the specific feature that are of the individual or of the moment, it expresses features that are general to a class and may be lacking or imperfect in the single instance.
Source: Kritik der zynischen Vernunft [Critique of Cynical Reason] (1983), p. xxxii
[U]n symbole n'est, à proprement parler, ni vrai, ni faux; il est plus ou moins bien choisi pour signifier la réalité qu'il représente, il la figure d'une manière plus ou moins précise, plus ou moins détaillée...
[Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem, translated by Philip P. Wiener, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, 1991, 069102524X, 168]
Notice sur les Titres et Travaux scientifiques de Pierre Duhem rédigée par lui-même lors de sa candidature à l'Académie des sciences (mai 1913), The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1906)