“It is the fault of our rhetoric that we cannot strongly state one fact without seeming to belie some other.”

— Ralph Waldo Emerson

1840s, Essays: First Series (1841), History

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Ralph Waldo Emerson727

American philosopher, essayist, and poet 1803–1882

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